Text of report in English by independent internet news agency KosovaLive
Prishtina [Pristina], 31 Dec (KosovaLive) - The head of UNMIK [UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo], Soren Jessen-Petersen, from his homeland, Denmark, has sent his wishes for the New Year to Kosova [Kosovo] citizens, expressing his belief that 2006 will see finalization of the status process.
"We are at the end of one momentous year for Kosova and the beginning of another. The past twelve months, like every year, have had their ups and their downs - their triumphs and their tragedies. But they have ended on a high with the opening of the process to determine the status of Kosova. The coming year will more likely see the end of that process," Jessen Petersen stated.
He said that Kosova has seen challenges this year and it has risen to those challenges with political maturity and dignity. "The peaceful transition when the prime minister resigned in March and the rallying in support around the president following his announcement of his health problem. These and many other instances showed to the world that the people of Kosova are looking to the future, not to the past."
"In partnership with the institutions of Kosova as a whole, the international community has continued to work on some of the challenges I spoke of a year ago: the rule of law, the protection of minorities, freedom of movement, return of displaced persons, and decentralization."
He emphasized that there was progress on these issues there can be no doubt - the opening of the status process is itself evidence of that. "But that there could have and needs to be more progress is also plain," he added.
He stressed that many of those issues that were priorities a year ago remain priorities today. The vehicle for achieving progress remains the Standards framework - a framework that will increasingly be geared towards your European goal.
"The standards implementation and improvements in the economy which are, I know, a principle concern for all of you will stay at the front and centre of the international community's efforts in Kosova. They will, I know, be at the heart of the IPVQ [Provisional Institutions of Self-government] policy as well. But for us all, the year, next year, 2006 will be dominated by the status talks."
He said that a sustainable status settlement must be based fundamentally on the desire of the majority in Kosova. "That desire is plain to all. But it is equally important that what the majority seeks for itself it must also seek for the minority communities and that is peace, stability, security, and economic prosperity."
Minority groups often feel, and often with reason, that they and their cultures are under threat. "I would like to look forward to a year when everyone in Kosovo can live freely and at ease with their and each other's culture and have no reason to fear the future."
"For this dream to be made real, the majority must extend the hand of friendship to the minorities and the minorities must take that hand. Another hope for Kosova in 2006, then, must be that it is the year when true political cooperation between all communities becomes a reality," said Kosova's chief administrator.
Saturday, December 31, 2005
Friday, December 30, 2005
Serbia-Montenegro faces tough 2006 over war crimes, division
BELGRADE, Dec 30 (AFP) -
The loose union of Serbia and Montenegro faces a tough year ahead with mounting pressure to arrest top war crimes fugitives, talks on Kosovo's future status, and even its possible dissolution.
The Balkan federation, which replaced Yugoslavia in 2003 in a bid to shake off the legacy of former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's regime, has a difficult task to fulfil its aspirations to join the Euro-Atlantic bloc.
Calls for the arrest of top war crimes fugitives, former Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic and his political leader Radovan Karadzic, who are believed to be within reach of Serbian security forces, have conditioned talks on Belgrade's closer ties with the European Union and NATO.
Brussels warned recently the next round of EU integration talks in February would only be held if Serbia-Montenegro's cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal is "fully realised" -- a diplomatic way of insisting on the arrest of the six remaining Serb fugitives.
Belgrade has since responded with a string of announcements in an effort to show it is doing its utmost to locate and hand over Mladic, the highest profile fugitive believed to be hiding in Serbia, by targeting his supporters.
"There is no doubt that the solution of Mladic's case is a precondition to solve all the problems" Serbia is facing, said President Boris Tadic.
Serbia-Montenegro Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic said no other state in the world "faces such challenges" in the coming year.
Apart from the war crimes burden, the sensitive issue of the status of Kosovo is to be tackled in talks between Belgrade and the territory's Albanian leaders.
Kosovo, legally still a part of Serbia, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign ousted Belgrade-controlled forces in 1999 to end a Serbian crackdown against separatist Albanian rebels.
Negotiation teams representing Belgrade and Pristina are to begin direct talks on Kosovo in January, with the key issue being whether to grant it the independence demanded by Albanians but strongly opposed by Belgrade.
"These talks will probably be the most difficult even for veteran diplomats as both Belgrade and Pristina are firmly stuck in their completely opposite positions," said a source close to the mediators.
Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, like all ethnic Albanian leaders, has insisted that "independence remains our main objective in the next year."
"The independence of Kosovo is not negotiable," said Rugova, who is battling the advanced stages of lung cancer and whose death would further complicate the situation.
Belgrade says it is only prepared to offer "more than autonomy, less than independence" in the talks, giving Albanians their own institutions but preserving Serbia's territorial integrity.
Kosovo could have "some kind of international representatives, but no seat in the United Nations, no defence sector and no ministry of foreign affairs," with an "international presence" needed at borders, Tadic told AFP in a recent interview.
The other major problem facing Serbia is a plan by Montenegro's government to hold a referendum on independence in the first few months of 2006.
Brussels fears that such a divorce could undermine both Belgrade's and Podgorica's EU entry bids, and officials also worry that another independence push, just as the Kosovo talks enter a delicate phase, could stir up regional tensions.
Undaunted, "my message to all of our friends in the international community is that they should be prepared for a new political reality in the Balkans in May next year and that will be the existence of a new state -- independent Montenegro," said the republic's Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic.
Montenegro is about a tenth the size of Serbia and has a population of about 650,000, but its people share the same language and religion as Serbians.
The loose union of Serbia and Montenegro faces a tough year ahead with mounting pressure to arrest top war crimes fugitives, talks on Kosovo's future status, and even its possible dissolution.
The Balkan federation, which replaced Yugoslavia in 2003 in a bid to shake off the legacy of former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's regime, has a difficult task to fulfil its aspirations to join the Euro-Atlantic bloc.
Calls for the arrest of top war crimes fugitives, former Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic and his political leader Radovan Karadzic, who are believed to be within reach of Serbian security forces, have conditioned talks on Belgrade's closer ties with the European Union and NATO.
Brussels warned recently the next round of EU integration talks in February would only be held if Serbia-Montenegro's cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal is "fully realised" -- a diplomatic way of insisting on the arrest of the six remaining Serb fugitives.
Belgrade has since responded with a string of announcements in an effort to show it is doing its utmost to locate and hand over Mladic, the highest profile fugitive believed to be hiding in Serbia, by targeting his supporters.
"There is no doubt that the solution of Mladic's case is a precondition to solve all the problems" Serbia is facing, said President Boris Tadic.
Serbia-Montenegro Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic said no other state in the world "faces such challenges" in the coming year.
Apart from the war crimes burden, the sensitive issue of the status of Kosovo is to be tackled in talks between Belgrade and the territory's Albanian leaders.
Kosovo, legally still a part of Serbia, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign ousted Belgrade-controlled forces in 1999 to end a Serbian crackdown against separatist Albanian rebels.
Negotiation teams representing Belgrade and Pristina are to begin direct talks on Kosovo in January, with the key issue being whether to grant it the independence demanded by Albanians but strongly opposed by Belgrade.
"These talks will probably be the most difficult even for veteran diplomats as both Belgrade and Pristina are firmly stuck in their completely opposite positions," said a source close to the mediators.
Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, like all ethnic Albanian leaders, has insisted that "independence remains our main objective in the next year."
"The independence of Kosovo is not negotiable," said Rugova, who is battling the advanced stages of lung cancer and whose death would further complicate the situation.
Belgrade says it is only prepared to offer "more than autonomy, less than independence" in the talks, giving Albanians their own institutions but preserving Serbia's territorial integrity.
Kosovo could have "some kind of international representatives, but no seat in the United Nations, no defence sector and no ministry of foreign affairs," with an "international presence" needed at borders, Tadic told AFP in a recent interview.
The other major problem facing Serbia is a plan by Montenegro's government to hold a referendum on independence in the first few months of 2006.
Brussels fears that such a divorce could undermine both Belgrade's and Podgorica's EU entry bids, and officials also worry that another independence push, just as the Kosovo talks enter a delicate phase, could stir up regional tensions.
Undaunted, "my message to all of our friends in the international community is that they should be prepared for a new political reality in the Balkans in May next year and that will be the existence of a new state -- independent Montenegro," said the republic's Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic.
Montenegro is about a tenth the size of Serbia and has a population of about 650,000, but its people share the same language and religion as Serbians.
Austria urges respect for Serbs in talks on Kosovo
BERLIN (AP) - Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel called in remarks released Friday for the "dignity of the Serbs" to be respected in talks over the future status of Kosovo.
Efforts to stabilize the Balkans are expected to be a focus of Austria's six-month presidency of the European Union, which begins on Jan. 1.
In a newspaper interview, Schuessel said Serbia faced difficult problems, from international pressure to hand over suspected war criminals to the future of its federation with Montenegro and efforts to revive the economy.
"I urge that we take the dignity of the Serbs very seriously," Schuessel was quoted as saying in an interview to appear in Saturday's Sueddeutsche Zeitung.
"Finding a new status for Kosovo will be unavoidable. But that can only happen in dialogue with the partners," Schuessel said.
U.N.-mediated talks are expected to begin in January on whether Kosovo becomes independent as demanded by ethnic Albanians or remains under the formal control of Serbia.
Kosovo, officially a province of Serbia-Montenegro, has been administered by the United Nations since a 1999 NATO bombing campaign halted the Serbian crackdown on independence-seeking ethnic Albanians.
Some 17,500 NATO-led peacekeepers are deployed in the province.
Efforts to stabilize the Balkans are expected to be a focus of Austria's six-month presidency of the European Union, which begins on Jan. 1.
In a newspaper interview, Schuessel said Serbia faced difficult problems, from international pressure to hand over suspected war criminals to the future of its federation with Montenegro and efforts to revive the economy.
"I urge that we take the dignity of the Serbs very seriously," Schuessel was quoted as saying in an interview to appear in Saturday's Sueddeutsche Zeitung.
"Finding a new status for Kosovo will be unavoidable. But that can only happen in dialogue with the partners," Schuessel said.
U.N.-mediated talks are expected to begin in January on whether Kosovo becomes independent as demanded by ethnic Albanians or remains under the formal control of Serbia.
Kosovo, officially a province of Serbia-Montenegro, has been administered by the United Nations since a 1999 NATO bombing campaign halted the Serbian crackdown on independence-seeking ethnic Albanians.
Some 17,500 NATO-led peacekeepers are deployed in the province.
Rugova’s faction against Daci (Lajm)
Lajm reports that Assembly Speaker Nexhat Daci is secretly trying to ‘cook’ the merger of LDK with the AAK into a ‘big union’. On the other hand, the faction of President Ibrahim Rugova fiercely opposes Daci’s actions, says the article adding that Nexhat Daci’s office has become a kitchen of all government coalitions and of party unions.
Nexhat Daci is close to concluding talks on merger of LDK and AAK into one single party the Democratic Union of Kosovo (UDK). His political advisor, Ramush Tahiri, who is the key negotiator in the process, has accepted, according to the paper, that talks are moving fast.
The article further reports that a few weeks ago, Daci brought together in his villa in Brezovica the key AAK officials, except Haradinaj. A source present in the meeting told the paper that Daci briefed AAK representatives that he had the support of 11 LDK MPs who were willing to break out of Rugova’s faction.
Daci’s idea was created when Rugova’s health deteriorated and the mission was entrusted to Ramush Tahiri and AAK official Ramiz Lladrovci.
Lutfi Haziri, Melihate Termkolli, Astrit Haraqija and other LDK members, including Sabri Hamiti’s ‘clan’, as the paper refers to it, are against the union.
“A big and well structured party as LDK does not need to merge with any small party, in this case the AAK,” Haziri is quoted as telling the paper.
The article quotes a source close to the British Office in Pristina as saying that such a union has been supported by most of the Western representatives in Pristina, because the international community is interested is eliminating the differences between the parties that emerged from the war and the pacifists, Lajm says.
AAK Secretary General, Ahmet Isufi, told the paper that there is no interest in either party for such a union and added that he is not aware of such negotiations taking place.
Nexhat Daci is close to concluding talks on merger of LDK and AAK into one single party the Democratic Union of Kosovo (UDK). His political advisor, Ramush Tahiri, who is the key negotiator in the process, has accepted, according to the paper, that talks are moving fast.
The article further reports that a few weeks ago, Daci brought together in his villa in Brezovica the key AAK officials, except Haradinaj. A source present in the meeting told the paper that Daci briefed AAK representatives that he had the support of 11 LDK MPs who were willing to break out of Rugova’s faction.
Daci’s idea was created when Rugova’s health deteriorated and the mission was entrusted to Ramush Tahiri and AAK official Ramiz Lladrovci.
Lutfi Haziri, Melihate Termkolli, Astrit Haraqija and other LDK members, including Sabri Hamiti’s ‘clan’, as the paper refers to it, are against the union.
“A big and well structured party as LDK does not need to merge with any small party, in this case the AAK,” Haziri is quoted as telling the paper.
The article quotes a source close to the British Office in Pristina as saying that such a union has been supported by most of the Western representatives in Pristina, because the international community is interested is eliminating the differences between the parties that emerged from the war and the pacifists, Lajm says.
AAK Secretary General, Ahmet Isufi, told the paper that there is no interest in either party for such a union and added that he is not aware of such negotiations taking place.
Serbia-Montenegro faces tough 2006 over war crimes, division
BELGRADE, Dec 30 (AFP) -
The loose union of Serbia and Montenegro faces a tough year ahead with mounting pressure to arrest top war crimes fugitives, talks on Kosovo's future status, and even its possible dissolution.
The Balkan federation, which replaced Yugoslavia in 2003 in a bid to shake off the legacy of former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's regime, has a difficult task to fulfil its aspirations to join the Euro-Atlantic bloc.
Calls for the arrest of top war crimes fugitives, former Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic and his political leader Radovan Karadzic, who are believed to be within reach of Serbian security forces, have conditioned talks on Belgrade's closer ties with the European Union and NATO.
Brussels warned recently the next round of EU integration talks in February would only be held if Serbia-Montenegro's cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal is "fully realised" -- a diplomatic way of insisting on the arrest of the six remaining Serb fugitives.
Belgrade has since responded with a string of announcements in an effort to show it is doing its utmost to locate and hand over Mladic, the highest profile fugitive believed to be hiding in Serbia, by targeting his supporters.
"There is no doubt that the solution of Mladic's case is a precondition to solve all the problems" Serbia is facing, said President Boris Tadic.
Serbia-Montenegro Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic said no other state in the world "faces such challenges" in the coming year.
Apart from the war crimes burden, the sensitive issue of the status of Kosovo is to be tackled in talks between Belgrade and the territory's Albanian leaders.
Kosovo, legally still a part of Serbia, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign ousted Belgrade-controlled forces in 1999 to end a Serbian crackdown against separatist Albanian rebels.
Negotiation teams representing Belgrade and Pristina are to begin direct talks on Kosovo in January, with the key issue being whether to grant it the independence demanded by Albanians but strongly opposed by Belgrade.
"These talks will probably be the most difficult even for veteran diplomats as both Belgrade and Pristina are firmly stuck in their completely opposite positions," said a source close to the mediators.
Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, like all ethnic Albanian leaders, has insisted that "independence remains our main objective in the next year."
"The independence of Kosovo is not negotiable," said Rugova, who is battling the advanced stages of lung cancer and whose death would further complicate the situation.
Belgrade says it is only prepared to offer "more than autonomy, less than independence" in the talks, giving Albanians their own institutions but preserving Serbia's territorial integrity.
Kosovo could have "some kind of international representatives, but no seat in the United Nations, no defence sector and no ministry of foreign affairs," with an "international presence" needed at borders, Tadic told AFP in a recent interview.
The other major problem facing Serbia is a plan by Montenegro's government to hold a referendum on independence in the first few months of 2006.
Brussels fears that such a divorce could undermine both Belgrade's and Podgorica's EU entry bids, and officials also worry that another independence push, just as the Kosovo talks enter a delicate phase, could stir up regional tensions.
Undaunted, "my message to all of our friends in the international community is that they should be prepared for a new political reality in the Balkans in May next year and that will be the existence of a new state -- independent Montenegro," said the republic's Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic.
Montenegro is about a tenth the size of Serbia and has a population of about 650,000, but its people share the same language and religion as Serbians.
The loose union of Serbia and Montenegro faces a tough year ahead with mounting pressure to arrest top war crimes fugitives, talks on Kosovo's future status, and even its possible dissolution.
The Balkan federation, which replaced Yugoslavia in 2003 in a bid to shake off the legacy of former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's regime, has a difficult task to fulfil its aspirations to join the Euro-Atlantic bloc.
Calls for the arrest of top war crimes fugitives, former Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic and his political leader Radovan Karadzic, who are believed to be within reach of Serbian security forces, have conditioned talks on Belgrade's closer ties with the European Union and NATO.
Brussels warned recently the next round of EU integration talks in February would only be held if Serbia-Montenegro's cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal is "fully realised" -- a diplomatic way of insisting on the arrest of the six remaining Serb fugitives.
Belgrade has since responded with a string of announcements in an effort to show it is doing its utmost to locate and hand over Mladic, the highest profile fugitive believed to be hiding in Serbia, by targeting his supporters.
"There is no doubt that the solution of Mladic's case is a precondition to solve all the problems" Serbia is facing, said President Boris Tadic.
Serbia-Montenegro Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic said no other state in the world "faces such challenges" in the coming year.
Apart from the war crimes burden, the sensitive issue of the status of Kosovo is to be tackled in talks between Belgrade and the territory's Albanian leaders.
Kosovo, legally still a part of Serbia, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign ousted Belgrade-controlled forces in 1999 to end a Serbian crackdown against separatist Albanian rebels.
Negotiation teams representing Belgrade and Pristina are to begin direct talks on Kosovo in January, with the key issue being whether to grant it the independence demanded by Albanians but strongly opposed by Belgrade.
"These talks will probably be the most difficult even for veteran diplomats as both Belgrade and Pristina are firmly stuck in their completely opposite positions," said a source close to the mediators.
Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, like all ethnic Albanian leaders, has insisted that "independence remains our main objective in the next year."
"The independence of Kosovo is not negotiable," said Rugova, who is battling the advanced stages of lung cancer and whose death would further complicate the situation.
Belgrade says it is only prepared to offer "more than autonomy, less than independence" in the talks, giving Albanians their own institutions but preserving Serbia's territorial integrity.
Kosovo could have "some kind of international representatives, but no seat in the United Nations, no defence sector and no ministry of foreign affairs," with an "international presence" needed at borders, Tadic told AFP in a recent interview.
The other major problem facing Serbia is a plan by Montenegro's government to hold a referendum on independence in the first few months of 2006.
Brussels fears that such a divorce could undermine both Belgrade's and Podgorica's EU entry bids, and officials also worry that another independence push, just as the Kosovo talks enter a delicate phase, could stir up regional tensions.
Undaunted, "my message to all of our friends in the international community is that they should be prepared for a new political reality in the Balkans in May next year and that will be the existence of a new state -- independent Montenegro," said the republic's Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic.
Montenegro is about a tenth the size of Serbia and has a population of about 650,000, but its people share the same language and religion as Serbians.
SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen’s New Year Message
We are at the end of one momentous year for Kosovo and the beginning of another. The past twelve months, like every year, have had their ups and their downs – their triumphs and their tragedies. But they have ended on a high – with the opening of the process to determine the status of Kosovo. The coming year will more likely see the end of that process.
Kosovo has seen challenges this year – and it has risen to those challenges with political maturity and dignity. The peaceful transition when the Prime Minister resigned in March; the rallying in support around the President following his announcement of his health problem. These and many other instances showed to the world that the people of Kosovo are looking to the future, not to the past.
In partnership with the institutions of Kosovo as a whole, the international community has continued to work on some of the challenges I spoke of a year ago: the rule of law; the protection of minorities; freedom of movement; return of displaced persons; decentralisation.
That there was progress on these issues there can be no doubt – the opening of the status process is itself evidence of that. But that there could have – and needs to be – more progress is also plain. Many of those issues that were priorities a year ago remain priorities today. The vehicle for achieving progress remains the Standards framework – a framework which will increasingly be geared towards your European goal.
Standards implementation – and improvements in the economy which are, I know, a principle concern for all of you – will stay at the front and centre of the international community’s efforts in Kosovo. They will, I know, be at the heart of the PISG’s policy as well. But for us all, the year, next year, 2006 will be dominated by the status talks.
What will the process bring? I have said before that it is to me self-evident that a sustainable status settlement must be based fundamentally on the desire of the majority in Kosovo. That desire is plain to all. But it is equally important that what the majority seeks for itself it must also seek for the minority communities – that is peace, stability, security and economic prosperity.
Minority groups often feel, and often with reason, that they and their cultures are under threat. I would like to look forward to a year when everyone in Kosovo can live freely and at ease with their and each other’s culture – and have no reason to fear the future.
For this dream to be made real, the majority must extend the hand of friendship to the minorities; and the minorities must take that hand. Another hope for Kosovo in 2006, then, must be that it is the year when true political co-operation between all communities become a reality.
These are earnest hopes – and they will be difficult to realise – but in December 2004, twelve months ago – it was equally hard to see Kosovo reaching the point it has achieved today; so if hopes can act as spurs to achievement, they are worth keeping hold of.
And so, with this happy vision in mind, I would like to wish Gëzuar Vitin i Ri, Srecna Nova Godina and Happy New Year to you all.
Kosovo has seen challenges this year – and it has risen to those challenges with political maturity and dignity. The peaceful transition when the Prime Minister resigned in March; the rallying in support around the President following his announcement of his health problem. These and many other instances showed to the world that the people of Kosovo are looking to the future, not to the past.
In partnership with the institutions of Kosovo as a whole, the international community has continued to work on some of the challenges I spoke of a year ago: the rule of law; the protection of minorities; freedom of movement; return of displaced persons; decentralisation.
That there was progress on these issues there can be no doubt – the opening of the status process is itself evidence of that. But that there could have – and needs to be – more progress is also plain. Many of those issues that were priorities a year ago remain priorities today. The vehicle for achieving progress remains the Standards framework – a framework which will increasingly be geared towards your European goal.
Standards implementation – and improvements in the economy which are, I know, a principle concern for all of you – will stay at the front and centre of the international community’s efforts in Kosovo. They will, I know, be at the heart of the PISG’s policy as well. But for us all, the year, next year, 2006 will be dominated by the status talks.
What will the process bring? I have said before that it is to me self-evident that a sustainable status settlement must be based fundamentally on the desire of the majority in Kosovo. That desire is plain to all. But it is equally important that what the majority seeks for itself it must also seek for the minority communities – that is peace, stability, security and economic prosperity.
Minority groups often feel, and often with reason, that they and their cultures are under threat. I would like to look forward to a year when everyone in Kosovo can live freely and at ease with their and each other’s culture – and have no reason to fear the future.
For this dream to be made real, the majority must extend the hand of friendship to the minorities; and the minorities must take that hand. Another hope for Kosovo in 2006, then, must be that it is the year when true political co-operation between all communities become a reality.
These are earnest hopes – and they will be difficult to realise – but in December 2004, twelve months ago – it was equally hard to see Kosovo reaching the point it has achieved today; so if hopes can act as spurs to achievement, they are worth keeping hold of.
And so, with this happy vision in mind, I would like to wish Gëzuar Vitin i Ri, Srecna Nova Godina and Happy New Year to you all.
Thursday, December 29, 2005
Kosovo premier appoints advisor for relations with Serbia
Belgrade, 28 December: A former high official of Kosovo and SFRJ [Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia], lawyer Azem Vlasi, has accepted to be Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi's advisor during talks on Kosovo status, the International Press Centre in Kosovska Mitrovica has stated.
[Passage omitted]
Vlasi has said, as local media have reported, that it has been agreed with the premier that he be the advisor for relations with Serbia and some neighbouring countries where Kosovo has interests, mentioning Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina in that context.
Source: FoNet news agency, Belgrade, in Serbian 1758 gmt 28 Dec 05
[Passage omitted]
Vlasi has said, as local media have reported, that it has been agreed with the premier that he be the advisor for relations with Serbia and some neighbouring countries where Kosovo has interests, mentioning Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina in that context.
Source: FoNet news agency, Belgrade, in Serbian 1758 gmt 28 Dec 05
Wednesday, December 28, 2005
LDK gets interior ministry, AAK justice ministry (Dailies)
The Ministry of Interior will be headed by LDK while the Ministry of Justice by AAK, Kosova Sot quotes a source as saying. The paper further says that now we are just waiting for the names of the ministers to be announced.
Under a big front-page headline Formulas for new ministries, Express reports that the problem with allocation of ministries between LDK and AAK will be solved through the creation of a new ministry for Euro-Atlantic Integrations. According to the first scenario the interior ministry and the ministry for Euro-Atlantic integrations will be headed by LDK, while the ministry of Justice by AAK. According to the second formula LDK gets ministries of interior and justice while AAK gets the ministry of integrations. The paper says that Ramë Maraj has been opposed to by the internationals, and quotes an unnamed diplomat in Pristina as saying that there is no chance that Maraj will lead the ministry as it needs professional and apolitical people. Express quotes sources as saying that LDK has a second option: the appointment of Çelëj Çelaj, an officer currently in the US.
Under a big front-page headline Formulas for new ministries, Express reports that the problem with allocation of ministries between LDK and AAK will be solved through the creation of a new ministry for Euro-Atlantic Integrations. According to the first scenario the interior ministry and the ministry for Euro-Atlantic integrations will be headed by LDK, while the ministry of Justice by AAK. According to the second formula LDK gets ministries of interior and justice while AAK gets the ministry of integrations. The paper says that Ramë Maraj has been opposed to by the internationals, and quotes an unnamed diplomat in Pristina as saying that there is no chance that Maraj will lead the ministry as it needs professional and apolitical people. Express quotes sources as saying that LDK has a second option: the appointment of Çelëj Çelaj, an officer currently in the US.
Tuesday, December 27, 2005
FINI: INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO POSSIBLE IF CONDITIONS ARE MET
is possible provided that specific conditions are met. Fini stressed the need for Italy to play an active role in the region and the outcome of the talks on the region's status can contribute so much to its stability. Kosovo is a Serbian province in which a majority of ethnic Albanians live and is currently administered by the United Nations. (AGI) -
Serbia 'cannot locate' fugitive
Serbia has denied reports that it knows the whereabouts of key war crimes fugitive Ratko Mladic.
Gen Mladic, on the run since 1995, has been charged with genocide and other crimes over the Bosnian war.
The interior minister said authorities had information on Gen Mladic, but they did not have enough to locate him.
Correspondents says the comments come amid growing speculation that Belgrade has been negotiating with Gen Mladic on his surrender to the Hague tribunal.
The government has faced international pressure to find and extradite Gen Mladic and former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.
UN war crimes prosecutor Carla del Ponte has urged Serbia to arrest the two by the end of this month.
Interior Minister Dragan Jocic told a parliamentary body in charge of Serbian security there was a "realistic possibility" that war crimes suspects including Gen Mladic were hiding in Serbia.
"But they are experienced warriors, the men who survived the war under difficult circumstances and they know how to do it," he said.
The BBC's Nick Hawton in Sarajevo says local media reports have suggested for some time that Gen Mladic has been in negotiations for his handover to the UN war crimes tribunal.
This weekend, a well-connected former police chief of Belgrade was reported as saying decisive talks were taking place for a surrender, and Gen Mladic was seeking guarantees for his family and supporters.
However, our correspondent says there have been many false dawns regarding the arrest of Gen Mladic and Mr Karadzic - and it is not yet clear whether the latest reports will lead to a breakthrough.
Gen Mladic, on the run since 1995, has been charged with genocide and other crimes over the Bosnian war.
The interior minister said authorities had information on Gen Mladic, but they did not have enough to locate him.
Correspondents says the comments come amid growing speculation that Belgrade has been negotiating with Gen Mladic on his surrender to the Hague tribunal.
The government has faced international pressure to find and extradite Gen Mladic and former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.
UN war crimes prosecutor Carla del Ponte has urged Serbia to arrest the two by the end of this month.
Interior Minister Dragan Jocic told a parliamentary body in charge of Serbian security there was a "realistic possibility" that war crimes suspects including Gen Mladic were hiding in Serbia.
"But they are experienced warriors, the men who survived the war under difficult circumstances and they know how to do it," he said.
The BBC's Nick Hawton in Sarajevo says local media reports have suggested for some time that Gen Mladic has been in negotiations for his handover to the UN war crimes tribunal.
This weekend, a well-connected former police chief of Belgrade was reported as saying decisive talks were taking place for a surrender, and Gen Mladic was seeking guarantees for his family and supporters.
However, our correspondent says there have been many false dawns regarding the arrest of Gen Mladic and Mr Karadzic - and it is not yet clear whether the latest reports will lead to a breakthrough.
Albanian parties in southern Serbia draft platform demanding autonomy
Text of report by Serbian news agency Beta
Presevo, 26 December: Representatives of Albanian parties and local institutions in Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja have today completed a draft political platform demanding autonomy for the three municipalities within the borders of Serbia.
Mithat Shaqipi, representative of the biggest Albanian party in southern Serbia, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), told BETA that the new platform was based on a "referendum on the political and territorial autonomy of Albanians, held on 1 and 2 March 1992.
"The Albanians' demand in the proposed platform is therefore autonomy for the region of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja within the borders of Serbia," said Shaqipi, who is a member of the working group that drafted the platform.
Asked when the platform would be presented to the public, Shaqipi said the working group would meet tomorrow in Pristina meet with Veton Surroi and present him the platform. Surroi is a member of the negotiating team of Kosovo.
The platform contains an annex that says that Albanians in southern Serbia would demand unification with Kosovo should there be a chance in Kosovo's borders, BETA was told by a source from the five-member working group that comprises representatives of Albanian parties from southern Serbia.
Source: Beta news agency, Belgrade, in Serbian 1938 gmt 26 Dec 05
Presevo, 26 December: Representatives of Albanian parties and local institutions in Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja have today completed a draft political platform demanding autonomy for the three municipalities within the borders of Serbia.
Mithat Shaqipi, representative of the biggest Albanian party in southern Serbia, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), told BETA that the new platform was based on a "referendum on the political and territorial autonomy of Albanians, held on 1 and 2 March 1992.
"The Albanians' demand in the proposed platform is therefore autonomy for the region of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja within the borders of Serbia," said Shaqipi, who is a member of the working group that drafted the platform.
Asked when the platform would be presented to the public, Shaqipi said the working group would meet tomorrow in Pristina meet with Veton Surroi and present him the platform. Surroi is a member of the negotiating team of Kosovo.
The platform contains an annex that says that Albanians in southern Serbia would demand unification with Kosovo should there be a chance in Kosovo's borders, BETA was told by a source from the five-member working group that comprises representatives of Albanian parties from southern Serbia.
Source: Beta news agency, Belgrade, in Serbian 1938 gmt 26 Dec 05
Kosovo premier vows to insist on independence despite pressure
Excerpt from report in English by independent internet news agency KosovaLive
Prishtina [Pristina], 26 December: Kosova [Kosovo] Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi said that even if the international community insisted on a compromise he would not sign anything less than full independence.
"I will not accept such a thing and believe that other members of the delegation will do the same," Kosumi said in an interview to KosovaLive.
He said that all political parties in the parliament had the mandate to create an independent and sovereign state, and anyone who accepted making a deal on this issue went beyond that mandate. "There is no compromise about independence," Kosumi added.
He emphasized that there were some other issues to be discussed with Serbia, such as religious heritage in Kosova or individual links of Kosova Serbs with Serbia.
As for the status talks and their length, the prime minister said that there was a general consensus between the Contact Group member states, Kosova political factor and the neighbouring countries that this process should not last too long.
The prime minister said that they have achieved significant results in the implementation of standards, stabilization of democracy, privatization, attracting of foreign investments, and economic capacity building. "There is no doubt that we have invested a lot in the fulfilment of our dream," said Kosumi, adding that the beginning of the status talks was a result of the government's work.
Prishtina [Pristina], 26 December: Kosova [Kosovo] Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi said that even if the international community insisted on a compromise he would not sign anything less than full independence.
"I will not accept such a thing and believe that other members of the delegation will do the same," Kosumi said in an interview to KosovaLive.
He said that all political parties in the parliament had the mandate to create an independent and sovereign state, and anyone who accepted making a deal on this issue went beyond that mandate. "There is no compromise about independence," Kosumi added.
He emphasized that there were some other issues to be discussed with Serbia, such as religious heritage in Kosova or individual links of Kosova Serbs with Serbia.
As for the status talks and their length, the prime minister said that there was a general consensus between the Contact Group member states, Kosova political factor and the neighbouring countries that this process should not last too long.
The prime minister said that they have achieved significant results in the implementation of standards, stabilization of democracy, privatization, attracting of foreign investments, and economic capacity building. "There is no doubt that we have invested a lot in the fulfilment of our dream," said Kosumi, adding that the beginning of the status talks was a result of the government's work.
Serbs protest Kosovo shootings
KOSOVSKA MITROVICA, Serbia-Montenegro, Dec 27 (AFP) -
Some 1,000 Serbs took to the streets of Mitrovica on Tuesday, voicing their anger after two Serbs were shot and wounded in the ethnically divided town in Kosovo.
"The latest attacks show that ethnic cleansing is happening," shouted protesters at the demonstration in the centre of the mainly Serb-populated northern part of the town.
"If UNMIK (the UN mission in Kosovo) cannot guarantee our security, there is only solution left -- the return of Serbian military and police" to the province of Kosovo, they said.
The gathering was held in response to the shooting of two ethnic Serbs in Mitrovica early Monday. Both victims were taken to hospital, and one of them is recovering from an operation on gunshot wounds to his stomach.
Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations and NATO since June 1999, when the alliance's intervention ended a crackdown by Belgrade-controlled forces against separatist ethnic Albanian rebels.
More than 200,000 ethnic Serbs have since fled the province fearing reprisals from Albanians after the 1998-1999 conflict, according to Serbia's government.
Out of the estimated 80,000 Serbs who remain in Kosovo, some 30,000 live in enclaves in the central part of the province, as ethnic tensions remain high.
Albanians, who outnumber Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo by more than nine to one, are seeking independence from Serbia in the recently opened talks on the province's future status.
Some 1,000 Serbs took to the streets of Mitrovica on Tuesday, voicing their anger after two Serbs were shot and wounded in the ethnically divided town in Kosovo.
"The latest attacks show that ethnic cleansing is happening," shouted protesters at the demonstration in the centre of the mainly Serb-populated northern part of the town.
"If UNMIK (the UN mission in Kosovo) cannot guarantee our security, there is only solution left -- the return of Serbian military and police" to the province of Kosovo, they said.
The gathering was held in response to the shooting of two ethnic Serbs in Mitrovica early Monday. Both victims were taken to hospital, and one of them is recovering from an operation on gunshot wounds to his stomach.
Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations and NATO since June 1999, when the alliance's intervention ended a crackdown by Belgrade-controlled forces against separatist ethnic Albanian rebels.
More than 200,000 ethnic Serbs have since fled the province fearing reprisals from Albanians after the 1998-1999 conflict, according to Serbia's government.
Out of the estimated 80,000 Serbs who remain in Kosovo, some 30,000 live in enclaves in the central part of the province, as ethnic tensions remain high.
Albanians, who outnumber Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo by more than nine to one, are seeking independence from Serbia in the recently opened talks on the province's future status.
Monday, December 26, 2005
Ex-premier insists on Kosovo independence
Former Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi has said "there can be no conditional independence", adding that "there can be either independence or nothing". He said Kosovo was demanding independence from Serbia, not from the international community, and that NATO could stay in Kosovo as long as it was necessary. The following is the text of interview with Rexhepi by Edlira Prenga; place and date not given, entitled "Rexhepi: Negotiations at shuttle diplomacy stage", published by Albanian newspaper Koha Jone on 22 December, the first paragraph is Koha Jone introduction:
Former Kosova [Kosovo] Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi commented yesterday on all the latest developments in Kosova concerning its final status. Rexhepi said that the negotiations were at an initial stage and the most important thing was to ensure that this stage would end with the establishment of an international group, which would provide a final solution to this process. Referring to the constitution, among other things, he said that the Serbian minorities in Kosova enjoyed the best status in Europe. However, the problem was that the Serbs were not integrated into the Kosova institutions. On the other hand, he also commented on the role of Albania. He said that Albania had so far displayed mature behaviour, without making strong declarations. As far as the term "conditional independence" is concerned, Rexhepi said that Kosova has already left that stage behind, and what it now needed was independence without conditions.
[Prenga] The talks on defining Kosova's final status have already started. What do you think about the beginning of this important process?
[Rexhepi] After a long, six-year waiting period, the talks on defining Kosova's definitive status have at least begun. At first, we had the visit of Marti Ahtisari, the chief negotiator, with his team to Prishtina [Pristina], Belgrade, Podgorica and Shkup [Skopje] to collect our opinions and proposals. This is described as the initial shuttle diplomacy in which no-one has a clear plan of how these talks will continue. We will wait for another direct meeting between the Kosova and Serbian sides with the mediation of the chief negotiator or other international structures, even though everyone familiar with reality in the Balkans knows that these negotiations will not be successful and might, initially, fail, because we have had enough time, decades on end, and we have not been able to resolve our problems, particularly after the war.
Therefore, it is very likely that the two sides will not be able to agree on high-standing concepts. I think that the process should end with the convocation of an international conference, which might attempt to resolve the question of Kosova's status.
[Prenga] According to some rumours, there are conflicts in the negotiating group on the definition of Kosova's status. You said that the negotiations are at a shuttle stage. What should Kosova politicians practically do?
[Rexhepi] There is full unity in the Kosova negotiating group. In addition to the negotiating group, there is also a political group and expert sub-groups with coordinators, who will prepare the necessary documents and provide strong logistics.
The negotiating group is very clear about its mandate, which is based on the [Kosovo parliamentary] resolution for an independent and sovereign state. There are 11 points [of this resolution], which make clear what can be negotiated and what cannot be negotiated. This is the only mandate for decision-making; there is no other mandate. Every major decision should be subjected to discussion in the assembly. From this point of view, there is not much room for manoeuvre. We have not gone into these negotiations with maximum demands. Our demands are realistic; there are demands for an independent and sovereign Kosova. We have no flexibility, at all, as far as the independence is concerned. We are not ready to make any compromise on that.
Only if we have independence can we have a state claiming to be a functional democratic state, in which there is room for the protection of the human, ethnic, cultural, and religious rights, all at high standards. This is an area in which we have readiness and flexibility.
[Prenga] Referring to the situation and the position taken by Serbia and Greece, one can say that the Balkans is a "hotbed". How do you think can this situation be resolved?
[Rexhepi] It has been a "hotbed" particularly during the war. Now the situation is more peaceful. If, from a political point of view, it is considered a hotbed, I think that the independence of Kosova would stabilize the region, in general. One can expect the Serbs to disagree with Kosova's independence.
However, I do not think that the Greeks would have the same attitude, because Greek official policy is in line with the principles set by the Contact Group. Their view is not different from that of this group. They are interested to know what the status of the religious communities will be. They want us to accept that the religious communities are administered by the clerics themselves. However, we cannot accept the extra-territoriality of these communities. Therefore, I think that the Greeks will be in line with the Contact Group.
[Prenga] Will the Serbian minorities in Kosova be respected?
[Rexhepi] On the basis of the constitutional framework, the position of the Serbian minorities is more advanced than that of the minority communities in Europe. I can give you an example. They have been allotted 10 seats in the parliament irrespective of their election results. In the last parliamentary election they gained an additional 13 seats, which means that they had 23 seats at a time when their percentage [of the total population] is 5 to 6 per cent. They are, thus, well represented. However, the problem is that they are not integrated into the democratic institutions. They do not take part in the election and their dream is to have Kosova returned to Serbia.
[Prenga] What do you think about Albania's role in the settlement of Kosova status?
[Rexhepi] I think that this role has been, generally, positive. Albania has been continuously careful, with a pragmatic policy to ensure that it is a factor of stability in the Balkans, because this is, primarily, in the interest of Albania as well as in the interest of the region, in general. It has never made pompous, nationalist, or similar declarations.
Indeed, one can even say that Tirana's position has been more moderate than it should have been, because we justly expect Albania to come out openly, without hesitation, in favour of Kosova's independence. This position was, in fact, confirmed by [Albanian] Assembly Chairwoman [Jozefina Topalli], the delegation of [Albanian Assembly] foreign policy commission, and the [Albanian Assembly] European Integration [commission] in their meetings with us. This is natural, because we should now feel ourselves at ease. There will be two Albanian states in the Balkans and we will have better relations. This is normal.
[Prenga] Chief Negotiator Ahtisari declared during his recent visit to Albania that Albania can be an important player in these solutions.
[Rexhepi] Ahtisari has said that Albania will not be a decision-making factor and we know that it cannot be a decision-making factor. However, it can play a very active role by providing its support for the settlement of Kosova's definitive status. It cannot be a passive observer. It should play an active role, not a decision-making role, because no neighbouring country will take part in the decision-making process.
[Prenga] Foreign Minister Besnik Mustafaj has used the term of "conditional independence". What does this term really mean?
[Rexhepi] Mustafaj is not alone in using this term. There is speculation with it in Europe and, probably, the United States, depending on where the analysts are located. What does conditional independence mean? None of these analysts has explained whether it is now time for Kosova to acquire its independence. None of them has said what conditions should be set to Kosova.
I think that Kosova has currently a kind of status indicative of conditional independence. Therefore, it is right for us to expect independence, not conditions.
Such declarations can be made by the international community. But we cannot expect Albania to make them. We are ready to ask - and we will ask - for the presence of NATO for as long as necessary, for assistance in the judiciary in order to be more effective, for assistance in the economic structures, and in all the mechanisms of international interest.
In a way, we are demanding independence from Serbia, not from the international community. Therefore, there can be no conditional independence. There can be either independence or nothing.
[Prenga] Do you think that Kosova has sufficient potential to become an independent state?
[Rexhepi] This is relative. Even if you had an abundant budget with no limitations, you need 10 to 15 years to build all the state structures. Kosova is under construction. The government does not have all the potential. However, there are states with democratic institutions at a lower stage than those in Kosova and they are still surviving. A question could be whether Kosova can be economically viable and I think that it can be economically viable.
Source: Koha Jone, Tirana, in Albanian 22 Dec 05
Former Kosova [Kosovo] Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi commented yesterday on all the latest developments in Kosova concerning its final status. Rexhepi said that the negotiations were at an initial stage and the most important thing was to ensure that this stage would end with the establishment of an international group, which would provide a final solution to this process. Referring to the constitution, among other things, he said that the Serbian minorities in Kosova enjoyed the best status in Europe. However, the problem was that the Serbs were not integrated into the Kosova institutions. On the other hand, he also commented on the role of Albania. He said that Albania had so far displayed mature behaviour, without making strong declarations. As far as the term "conditional independence" is concerned, Rexhepi said that Kosova has already left that stage behind, and what it now needed was independence without conditions.
[Prenga] The talks on defining Kosova's final status have already started. What do you think about the beginning of this important process?
[Rexhepi] After a long, six-year waiting period, the talks on defining Kosova's definitive status have at least begun. At first, we had the visit of Marti Ahtisari, the chief negotiator, with his team to Prishtina [Pristina], Belgrade, Podgorica and Shkup [Skopje] to collect our opinions and proposals. This is described as the initial shuttle diplomacy in which no-one has a clear plan of how these talks will continue. We will wait for another direct meeting between the Kosova and Serbian sides with the mediation of the chief negotiator or other international structures, even though everyone familiar with reality in the Balkans knows that these negotiations will not be successful and might, initially, fail, because we have had enough time, decades on end, and we have not been able to resolve our problems, particularly after the war.
Therefore, it is very likely that the two sides will not be able to agree on high-standing concepts. I think that the process should end with the convocation of an international conference, which might attempt to resolve the question of Kosova's status.
[Prenga] According to some rumours, there are conflicts in the negotiating group on the definition of Kosova's status. You said that the negotiations are at a shuttle stage. What should Kosova politicians practically do?
[Rexhepi] There is full unity in the Kosova negotiating group. In addition to the negotiating group, there is also a political group and expert sub-groups with coordinators, who will prepare the necessary documents and provide strong logistics.
The negotiating group is very clear about its mandate, which is based on the [Kosovo parliamentary] resolution for an independent and sovereign state. There are 11 points [of this resolution], which make clear what can be negotiated and what cannot be negotiated. This is the only mandate for decision-making; there is no other mandate. Every major decision should be subjected to discussion in the assembly. From this point of view, there is not much room for manoeuvre. We have not gone into these negotiations with maximum demands. Our demands are realistic; there are demands for an independent and sovereign Kosova. We have no flexibility, at all, as far as the independence is concerned. We are not ready to make any compromise on that.
Only if we have independence can we have a state claiming to be a functional democratic state, in which there is room for the protection of the human, ethnic, cultural, and religious rights, all at high standards. This is an area in which we have readiness and flexibility.
[Prenga] Referring to the situation and the position taken by Serbia and Greece, one can say that the Balkans is a "hotbed". How do you think can this situation be resolved?
[Rexhepi] It has been a "hotbed" particularly during the war. Now the situation is more peaceful. If, from a political point of view, it is considered a hotbed, I think that the independence of Kosova would stabilize the region, in general. One can expect the Serbs to disagree with Kosova's independence.
However, I do not think that the Greeks would have the same attitude, because Greek official policy is in line with the principles set by the Contact Group. Their view is not different from that of this group. They are interested to know what the status of the religious communities will be. They want us to accept that the religious communities are administered by the clerics themselves. However, we cannot accept the extra-territoriality of these communities. Therefore, I think that the Greeks will be in line with the Contact Group.
[Prenga] Will the Serbian minorities in Kosova be respected?
[Rexhepi] On the basis of the constitutional framework, the position of the Serbian minorities is more advanced than that of the minority communities in Europe. I can give you an example. They have been allotted 10 seats in the parliament irrespective of their election results. In the last parliamentary election they gained an additional 13 seats, which means that they had 23 seats at a time when their percentage [of the total population] is 5 to 6 per cent. They are, thus, well represented. However, the problem is that they are not integrated into the democratic institutions. They do not take part in the election and their dream is to have Kosova returned to Serbia.
[Prenga] What do you think about Albania's role in the settlement of Kosova status?
[Rexhepi] I think that this role has been, generally, positive. Albania has been continuously careful, with a pragmatic policy to ensure that it is a factor of stability in the Balkans, because this is, primarily, in the interest of Albania as well as in the interest of the region, in general. It has never made pompous, nationalist, or similar declarations.
Indeed, one can even say that Tirana's position has been more moderate than it should have been, because we justly expect Albania to come out openly, without hesitation, in favour of Kosova's independence. This position was, in fact, confirmed by [Albanian] Assembly Chairwoman [Jozefina Topalli], the delegation of [Albanian Assembly] foreign policy commission, and the [Albanian Assembly] European Integration [commission] in their meetings with us. This is natural, because we should now feel ourselves at ease. There will be two Albanian states in the Balkans and we will have better relations. This is normal.
[Prenga] Chief Negotiator Ahtisari declared during his recent visit to Albania that Albania can be an important player in these solutions.
[Rexhepi] Ahtisari has said that Albania will not be a decision-making factor and we know that it cannot be a decision-making factor. However, it can play a very active role by providing its support for the settlement of Kosova's definitive status. It cannot be a passive observer. It should play an active role, not a decision-making role, because no neighbouring country will take part in the decision-making process.
[Prenga] Foreign Minister Besnik Mustafaj has used the term of "conditional independence". What does this term really mean?
[Rexhepi] Mustafaj is not alone in using this term. There is speculation with it in Europe and, probably, the United States, depending on where the analysts are located. What does conditional independence mean? None of these analysts has explained whether it is now time for Kosova to acquire its independence. None of them has said what conditions should be set to Kosova.
I think that Kosova has currently a kind of status indicative of conditional independence. Therefore, it is right for us to expect independence, not conditions.
Such declarations can be made by the international community. But we cannot expect Albania to make them. We are ready to ask - and we will ask - for the presence of NATO for as long as necessary, for assistance in the judiciary in order to be more effective, for assistance in the economic structures, and in all the mechanisms of international interest.
In a way, we are demanding independence from Serbia, not from the international community. Therefore, there can be no conditional independence. There can be either independence or nothing.
[Prenga] Do you think that Kosova has sufficient potential to become an independent state?
[Rexhepi] This is relative. Even if you had an abundant budget with no limitations, you need 10 to 15 years to build all the state structures. Kosova is under construction. The government does not have all the potential. However, there are states with democratic institutions at a lower stage than those in Kosova and they are still surviving. A question could be whether Kosova can be economically viable and I think that it can be economically viable.
Source: Koha Jone, Tirana, in Albanian 22 Dec 05
Two Serbs wounded in attacks in northern Kosovo
KOSOVSKA MITROVICA, Serbia-Montenegro (AP) - Two ethnic Serbs were wounded early Monday in separate attacks in U.N.-run Kosovo, police officials and doctors said.
The incidents happened around 0100 GMT in the Serb-held part of Kosovska Mitrovica, an ethnically divided town in the north of the province.
Police said that one person was seriously injured and the other lightly. Spokesman Sami Mehmeti gave no other details, but said there was no immediate indication that the attacks were ethnically motivated.
According to Serb sources in Kosovska Mitrovica, unknown assailants first shot at 35-year-old Branislav Antovic, a guard for the local authorities.
Local doctor Milan Ivanovic said Antovic was in life-threatening condition following four hours of surgery.
Dejan Maksimovic, 24, was shot in the leg while at his home in the ethnically mixed Bosnjacka Mahala part of town. Maksimovic told Belgrade-based Beta news agency that the attacker climbed to his balcony and fired at him.
Ivanovic said Maksimovic also underwent surgery but was in stable condition.
Kosovo remains tense years after a Serb-Albanian war over the region. There are fears that tensions could soar in the run-up to U.N.-brokered talks next year on the province's future status.
The incidents happened around 0100 GMT in the Serb-held part of Kosovska Mitrovica, an ethnically divided town in the north of the province.
Police said that one person was seriously injured and the other lightly. Spokesman Sami Mehmeti gave no other details, but said there was no immediate indication that the attacks were ethnically motivated.
According to Serb sources in Kosovska Mitrovica, unknown assailants first shot at 35-year-old Branislav Antovic, a guard for the local authorities.
Local doctor Milan Ivanovic said Antovic was in life-threatening condition following four hours of surgery.
Dejan Maksimovic, 24, was shot in the leg while at his home in the ethnically mixed Bosnjacka Mahala part of town. Maksimovic told Belgrade-based Beta news agency that the attacker climbed to his balcony and fired at him.
Ivanovic said Maksimovic also underwent surgery but was in stable condition.
Kosovo remains tense years after a Serb-Albanian war over the region. There are fears that tensions could soar in the run-up to U.N.-brokered talks next year on the province's future status.
Riots in the biggest prison in Kosovo - television
PRISTINA, Dec 26 (Hina) - Almost 30 inmates tried to run from the largest prison in Kosovo overnight, the Kosovo Television reported on Monday adding that the situation went back to normal in the morning.
No other details about the situation in the Dubrava prison were revealed.
Firearms were allegedly used, but the police had not confirmed it.
Prisoners in the Dubrava jail have frequently complained about inhumane and poor conditions in that penitentiary institution.
Ten days ago, a dozen inmates attempted an escape from Dubrava.
No other details about the situation in the Dubrava prison were revealed.
Firearms were allegedly used, but the police had not confirmed it.
Prisoners in the Dubrava jail have frequently complained about inhumane and poor conditions in that penitentiary institution.
Ten days ago, a dozen inmates attempted an escape from Dubrava.
Sunday, December 25, 2005
Kosovo’s Moment of Truth
By Tim Judah
(Survival vol. 47 no. 4 Winter 2005–06 pp. 73–84)
For the last six years Kosovo has been run as protectorate of the United Nations. That chapter of its history is now coming to an end. Very soon – probably at least by December 2005 – talks should begin on the future status of this territory bitterly disputed between Serbs and Albanians. It is widely expected that, against the wishes of the government in Belgrade, Kosovo will be granted some form of ‘conditional independence’. Exactly what this means remains to be seen.
The roots of the Kosovo conflict lie in the fact that more than 90% of its two million people are ethnic Albanians.1 That Kosovo, within anyone’s living memory, has always had a high preponderance of Albanians made it a particular political problem within Yugoslavia. Since 1999, however, the link with Serbia has, in all but de jure terms, been severed. The likelihood that it can be restored seems fanciful to say the least.
In 1989 Serbia, under Slobodan Milosevic, abolished Kosovo’s autonomy. During the major Yugoslav wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo stayed quiet. In 1998, however, a guerrilla war broke out. Events escalated until NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign over what was then still known as Yugoslavia. After a period of frantic diplomacy Milosevic surrendered, Serbia pulled its forces out of Kosovo and much of the local administration collapsed. They were replaced by the UN and a NATO-led force called KFOR. This arrangement was blessed by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided the legal basis for the current situation in Kosovo. The resolution recognised the territorial integrity of what was then called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and instructed what was to become the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to promote, ‘pending a final settlement … substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo taking into full account … the Rambouillet Accords’.
The ill-fated Rambouillet meeting outside Paris preceded NATO’s bombardment of 1999. The Serbian side did not agree to the text it was asked to sign, one reason being that this document had foreseen that Kosovo’s future would, after three years, be decided ’on the basis of the will of the people’. The Serbs argued that since the Albanians were in favour of inde¬pendence, this phrase could only mean that they would lose their southern province, which they regard as the cradle of their civilisation. Thus, at its very heart, Resolution 1244 contained a contradiction – pitting the Kosovo majority’s right to self-determination against the equally valid legal prin¬ciple of the territorial integrity of states. Up to now it has been possible to avoid resolving this contradiction. Today, however, in the words of UNMIK head Søren Jessen-Petersen, Kosovo is facing ’its moment of truth’.
Since 1999 Kosovo has changed beyond recognition. The first and most obvious change is that there are no longer any Serbs in any of Kosovo’s major urban settlements, bar north Mitrovica, which is a divided city. The end of Serbian rule culminated in the flight and ethnic cleansing of large numbers of Serbs (and Roma), very few of whom have returned. Today one-third of the estimated 100,000 Serbs who remain in Kosovo live in Mitrovica and the overwhelmingly Serbian-inhabited north of Kosovo, which is contiguous with Serbia. The rest live in enclaves scattered throughout the rest of the province. Some of these need 24-hour military protection, as do Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries. Economically, Kosovo remains extremely weak and unemployment high, though reliable figures are hard to come by. Average wages are now around €200 a month and many families depend on remittances from the large Kosovo diaspora living and working abroad, especially in Western Europe.
Since 1999, the UN has set up a government structure in Kosovo. Powers are gradually being devolved to elected bodies and their ministries. Most Serbs boycott these institutions, either at the behest of the authorities in Belgrade or because they believe that on those occasions when they did participate, they were simply used in an Albanian effort to deceive the outside world into believing that a real multi-ethnic society was being built in Kosovo. The boycott is controversial, however. Some Serb leaders believe they have lost more than they have gained by staying outside of Kosovo’s structures.
In December 2003 UNMIK, together with the government of Kosovo, promulgated a list of so-called ‘Standards’ against which Kosovo’s progress could be measured, covering everything from rule of law to minority rights. At the same time the UN and other diplomats – adopting the slogan ‘Standards before Status’ – made clear that the issue of Kosovo’s final status was not on the agenda for the immediate future. In November 2003, however, the ‘Contact Group’ of main outside powers announced that if all went well, by the middle of 2005 a comprehensive review of standards would open the way for talks on the future status of the province. The irony is that talks may soon begin not because things went well, but because they went disastrously wrong. In March 2004 riots broke out in which some 4,000 Serbs and Roma were driven from their homes and 19 killed. It became starkly clear that the status quo was untenable and, if there was a new upsurge in violence, UNMIK might even collapse. Immediately after the riots UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called in a diplomat with considerable Balkan experience to lead an inquiry into what had caused them. The insights of this diplomat, Norwegian ambassador to NATO Kai Eide, helped convince Annan and many others that dangerous stagnation had set in; the only way to avoid a new conflagration was to give the impression that Kosovo was somehow moving forward and was not doomed to remain forever a forgotten, poverty-stricken corner of Europe.
Kosovo’s Albanian leaders either quickly understood, or were made to understand by diplomats and the foreign leaders that they met, that the riots had been disastrous for their international image. In December 2004, following elections, a new government came to power headed by former Kosovo Liberation Army commander Ramush Haradinaj. With much force and skill, Haradinaj moved to get Kosovo to live up to the Standards and even to reach out to the Serbs. Being a skilful premier was not enough, however, to stop allegations about his past catching up with him. In March 2005 he was indicted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague for war crimes dating back to 1998. With much dignity he resigned and departed but, contrary to expectations, Kosovo remained calm. In part this was because Albanian leaders understood that, if angry Kosovars began rampaging once again, the prospect of the comprehensive review would clearly diminish. This time they played their cards well and in June Kofi Annan invited Kai Eide back to begin the review.
Eide delivered his report on 4 October. Annan passed it on to the Security Council three days later, saying he accepted its recommendations. ‘The time has come’, said Annan, ’to move to the next phase of the political process.’ He added that he now intended to ’initiate preparations’ for the appointment of ‘a Special Envoy to lead the future status process.’ At the time of writing it was widely expected that he would choose Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president who played a key role in securing Milosevic’s agreement to the terms which ended NATO’s bombardment of Yugoslavia in 1999.
Eide’s most important point was that talks on the future status of Kosovo should begin. He was not asked to say what he thought the final status of Kosovo should be and, significantly, he uses the words ‘future status’ rather than ‘final status’. This implies, and indeed Eide in places explicitly says, that international involvement in the contested province will continue for many years. ’The international community must do the utmost to ensure that whatever the status becomes it does not become a “failed” status’, he writes. ’Entering the future status process does not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage in the process.’
Progress in meeting the Standards as a whole has been uneven, Eide says: ’regrettably, little has been achieved to create a foundation for a multi-ethnic society’. Talks should nevertheless begin, he says, because the momentum and expectations have built up; ’having moved from stagnation to expecta¬tion, stagnation cannot be allowed to take hold’.
Some of Eide’s recommendations may be carried out whatever the result of status talks. The EU, he argues, should play a prominent role, especially in police and judicial matters. NATO, too, will have to stay, with at least some contribution from the US ‘in order to provide a visible expression of [America’s] continued engagement’. Certain elements of the international presence in Bosnia should be copied for Kosovo. These include the role of the ‘high representative’, currently Britain’s Paddy Ashdown, who exer¬cises huge powers and can fire any elected official in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, Ashdown holds a kind of hybrid position – both ‘high representative’ of the intervening powers and international community, vaguely defined, but also the EU’s special representative to Bosnia. Eide suggests a similar arrangement for the post-UNMIK era in Kosovo: a high represenative with extraordinary powers in the field of inter-ethnic relations, but who is also ‘firmly anchored’ in the EU.
Regarding Kosovo’s Serbian minority, Eide argues in favour of an ’ambi¬tious decentralisation plan‘ which would give Kosovo Serbs competences ’in areas such as police, justice, education, culture, media and the economy’. He also recommends that what he terms ’protective space’ should be created around Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions and that ways should be found to place them ‘under a form of international protection’. He adds: ‘it is important not only to protect individual sites as cultural and religious monuments, but also living communities’.
Albanian and Serb reactions to the Eide report were mixed. Albanian leaders reacted exuberantly to the fact that it had recommended that talks begin, but initially said little about the content of the report. Although giving praise where praise was due, the report was largely damning about corruption and the majority’s treatment of the Serb minority. Reactions in Serbia were on the whole positive, although not without criticisms. If the Standards had not been met, asked some, then why was Eide recommending that talks begin? To a great extent this was empty rhetoric, since by the time the report was issued Belgrade and Pristina were already readying themselves for talks, or at least were supposed to be.
As late as June 2005, on the Serb side a degree of denial still prevailed. Officials in Belgrade described Serbia’s policy as anticipating that Kosovo could have ‘more than autonomy, but less than independence’. What this meant was unclear. Some officials, such as Aleksandar Simic, an adviser to Premier Vojislav Kostunica, said that this meant that although being autonomous, the future Kosovo would send back deputies to the parliament in Belgrade and play a full role in running the whole country.13 Serbia has a population of 7.5 million, as against some 2m for Kosovo. The forcible reincorporation of such a large number of implacably hostile Albanians into the Serbian body politic seemed so far from reality or in the interests of a stable Serbia that one could only wonder: had Serbian strategists, unable in the past six years to visit Kosovo at will, simply lost any grasp of the reality there?
By autumn 2005, however, a more realistic concept of what was possible was emerging. Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, the head of the Serbian government’s Coordination Centre for Kosovo, was saying that she envisaged the province having full autonomy in the judicial, executive and legislative fields but that defence, foreign affairs and sovereignty would remain in the hands of Serbia. Dusan Batakovic, a historian and diplomat with a deep knowledge of Kosovo, and now advisor to Serbian President Boris Tadic, elaborated on this: he did not expect that the Albanians would want to return to parliament in Belgrade, though this option remained. He also said that, in preparing for talks, he was gaming various scenarios of what might happen.
It seems unlikely that the Serbian idea of ‘more than autonomy but less than independence’ will gain support amongst the big powers who will help arbitrate Kosovo’s fate. However, the new position, despite the occasional nationalistic outburst, is expressed in the mild language of compromise; the Serbs claim they are trying to find a happy median between the Albanian desire for self-rule and their desire to defend Serbia’s territorial integrity. In private, some senior Serbian leaders say they believe that ‘conditional independence’ for Kosovo is inevitable, but they will nonetheless put up a fierce rearguard struggle to prevent it. No Serbian leader wants to go down in history as the one who lost Kosovo, so if this rearguard action succeeds in staving off independence during their watch – which is conceivable, if unlikely – they will regard the talks as a success.
In Pristina, preparations for talks lag far behind those of Belgrade. Publicly, everyone from President Ibrahim Rugova to Premier Bajram Kosumi says that they are willing to talk with the Serbs about everything except independence, which is non-negotiable. Pristina’s position, in other words, is the mirror image of Belgrade’s. This position is understandable from their point of view, but what seems alarming is the lack of prepara¬tion for any succession issues, in light of the experience of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Since 1999, for example, Serbia has not paid pensions to Albanian workers who had paid their contributions like other Yugoslav citizens. When Kosovo Albanian negotiators demand this money, the Serbs will retort that they have paid the interest on Kosovo’s interna¬tional debt for the last six years.
Indeed, diplomats in Pristina fret that the main Kosovan leaders are simply unprepared for talks and have been lulled, by talk of ‘conditional independence’, into a false sense of security. They do not seem to appreciate the threat, from their point of view, of the preparations being made by the Serbs.15 Indeed, Albanians recently were outraged when the International Telecommunications Union failed to quickly accede to a request from UNMIK to allot Kosovo an international direct-dialling code separate from Serbia’s. This was thanks to deft diplomacy on the part of Serbia, although the issue has not yet been finally settled.
Some skilled people will be at the coming talks, as part of a team already selected by Rugova. But the question is whether there are enough of them. The two best men on the team, not being major political figures, have the least clout. One is Blerim Shala, the editor of the daily Zeri, who has been asked to coordinate the team’s working groups; the other is Veton Surroi, the publisher and now leader of the small opposition party Ora. The rest of the team leave room for concern, quite apart from personal antipathies within the group. Nexhat Daci, the speaker of parliament, is widely regarded by diplomats who deal with Kosovo as an old-style, inflexible demagogue and by opposition leaders as unacceptably authoritarian. Next is Bajram Kosumi, the likeable but weak premier who succeeded Ramush Haradinaj. A whiff of scandal hangs over his premiership following allegations of corruption which appeared in the press. President Ibrahim Rugova is the best-known international symbol of Kosovo and his authority is unmatched. However, he has lung cancer and nobody knows how his health will hold up over the next few months. If he dies or is incapacitated soon this will provoke a major political upheaval as rival camps, which are already emerging, fight for the leadership of his Democratic League of Kosovo, the largest single party in Kosovo. His demise could also fatally weaken the Kosovo Albanian negoti¬ating team, as the others fight for a leadership role. Finally there is Hashim Thaci, the leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo, who used to be the political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army. All these men, bar Daci, participated in the Rambouillet negotiations.
At the time of writing the Eide report was awaiting examination by the Security Council. According to diplomatic sources, once this stage has been passed and Ahtisaari or someone else has been selected to lead the talks, three deputies – from the US, EU and Russia -- will be chosen. A period of shuttle diplomacy will begin, perhaps in December, and at some point in early 2006 the team could retire to write a draft agreement. While working groups of Serbs and Albanians may go over certain individual questions, the main negotiators will not yet meet. Indeed, a proposal which had been floated behind the scenes in late summer for a formal opening of talks was quashed on the grounds that both sides would then be obliged to state positions publicly, which would later reduce their room for manoeuvre and flexibility. According to Veton Surroi, a realistic scenario foresees the Serb and Albanian main negotiating teams summoned to meet around May 2006 ‘in a castle in Austria’. In January Austria takes over the presidency of the EU.
What happens next is impossible to predict. One scenario outlined by a senior diplomatic source foresees that the Serbian team will fight hard to make sure that the agreement contains all possible safeguards for the Kosovo Serbs, acknowledging its own interests and in institutionalising international protection for Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches.18 Having achieved this, the Serbs could then refuse to endorse the plan because it also points the way to Kosovo’s independence. Reluctantly, perhaps, the Albanians would then be compelled to accept more in terms of Serbian rights in Kosovo than they would have done otherwise, but under international pressure they might see such concessions as the price of independence.
At the same time Serbia’s leaders, none of whom want to take responsibility for losing Kosovo, could claim that, at this point and having fought as hard as possible, Kosovo was taken away from Serbia. Since Serbia did not give its consent, it will not recognise the emerging state and hence, as far as it is concerned, its status could (theoretically,) be reversed at a later date. If this is in fact how the situ¬ation develops, this Serb position will, sooner or later, have to be modified, if only as the price of EU membership – as recent quarrels over Turkey and the question of its recognition of Cyprus have demonstrated.
It is impossible to know in advance what the UN-led negotiating team might propose. But since the widespread assumption is that it will be some form of ‘conditional independence’, it is worth examining what this could mean. In broad terms it would certainly mean adopting some of the recom¬mendations discussed by Eide, but more specifically it may well be that the negotiators are guided by the blueprint of the International Commission on the Balkans. This independent group, which issued its report in April 2005, was chaired by former Italian Premier Giuliano Amato, and for the most part included people either from or with a deep knowledge and experience of the Balkans. They proposed that Kosovo should move towards independence in four stages. The first, ‘de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia’, seems to describe the current situation. The second is called ‘independence without full sovereignty’, which is described as meaning that Kosovo is an independent entity but not yet a sovereign state and one in which the international community ‘reserves powers in the fields of human rights and minorities’ – a theme which was echoed by Eide. The third stage is called ‘guided sovereignty’, and would ‘coincide with Kosovo’s recognition as a candidate for EU membership’ and in which the international community would lose its reserve powers which would be replaced by ‘influence through the negotiation process’. The fourth and final stage is called ‘full and final sovereignty’, and is marked by the ‘absorption of Kosovo into the EU and its adoption of the shared sover¬eignty to which all members are subject’.
The Serbs hope that it will not come to this, and with skilful diplomacy they might stand a slim chance of at least making the technical status of Kosovo somewhat vaguer and more drawn out than that described above. For this they would probably need vigorous support from Russia, however, and according to diplomatic sources the Russians have already decided to betray the Serbs.20 For the benefit of the Serbian press, Russian diplomats say that they will not accept any solution for Kosovo which is not endorsed by Belgrade, but to Western diplomats they are saying precisely the oppo¬site. It has always been widely assumed that Russia, citing the precedent of Chechnya, would oppose Kosovo’s independence. Now, however, three things seem to have happened. In 2003 Russian troops were withdrawn from the Balkans. This has dramatically lowered Russia’s diplomatic leverage in the region. Secondly, Russian diplomats have concluded that there is no realistic way to reconnect Kosovo and its hostile population to Belgrade. Thirdly, they have concluded, and indeed told visiting foreign ministers, that as far as they are concerned the question of precedent could be used to their advantage. That is to say, they are noting that if Kosovo can secede from a sovereign state, then the same argument can potentially be applied in areas of the former Soviet Union where they have interests, specifically Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Trans-Dniester in Moldova.
China is unlikely to resist the independence of Kosovo if Russia does not, although this cannot be taken for granted. While China has never taken an active role or even interest in the Balkans, it did veto the continuation of a UN peacekeeping force in Macedonia in 1999. The Serbs might succeed in persuading China that independence for Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent for Taiwan or even Tibet. Whatever the repercussions for Tibet, Serbian politicians argue that if Kosovo is granted some form of independence this would destabilise the region in a way they could not control. They argue, for example, that if they cannot prevent the loss of Kosovo, Serbia might succumb to a renewed wave of angry nationalism and the Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj, now on trial in The Hague on war-crimes charges, might come to power. This is conceivable. The Radicals are already the largest party in parlia¬ment, although they are not in government. Outside of Serbia’s borders, the Serbian argument runs, Kosovo’s independence would embolden Albanian nationalists in Macedonia, thus perhaps prompting the disintegration of that state, with its large Albanian minority. The Serb part of Bosnia would again raise its wartime demand to secede and join Serbia.
Diplomats who follow the region are of course well acquainted with this line of argument, which played a decisive role in the EU’s decision in October to begin talks with Serbia on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Diplomats openly said that they decided not to let the outstanding issue of Ratko Mladic, the fugitive Bosnian Serb wartime commander wanted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, stand in the way of the opening of negotiations. They are hoping that the good news of the conclusion of an agreement next year may help counteract the simultaneous bad news of the loss of Kosovo and likely secession of Montenegro from the loose federation which currently links it to Serbia.
Albanians counter these arguments about radicalisation in Serbia with the argument that, unless they get independence, it is certain that hardliners will again resort to arms; in the ensuing uprising KFOR and representa¬tives of the international community present in Kosovo will be targeted. UN vehicles are already targets of the occasional bomb.
In the shorter term there is another threat. Over the last few months, Albin Kurti, a 30-year-old former student leader and political prisoner, has been organising young people across Kosovo. Studying the techniques used by those who organised the overthrow of former regimes in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, Kurti wants to ready his people to come out in protest against the talks on Kosovo’s future status.
Kurti says that talks, by their very nature, aim at compromise and there can be no compromise on Kosovo’s independence. He fears that what he calls Kosovo’s ‘corrupt’ politicians might yet buckle on this if put under pres¬sure. He argues that talks with Serbia should only take place when Kosovo is already independent and thus can sit at the table as an equal. His slogan – ‘No negotiations! Self Determination!’ – already decorates walls across Kosovo but his strength is, as yet, untested. If, however, at some point in the near future or during talks one of the Albanian leaders, for example Hashim Thaci, decided to ‘play the Kurti card’ and swing his support behind him then the outcome would be not only unpredictable but in such an unstable and highly charged situation a fresh wave of anti-Serbian ethnic cleansing similar to that of March 2004 might break out.
Diplomats who deal with Kosovo all repeat the mantra that they have no preconceived agenda, beyond wanting to prohibit the physical partition of Kosovo or a possible future union with Albania, and that they want Serbs and Albanians to reach agreement on the territory’s future among themselves. All of them know, however, and admit in private, that the likelihood of this happening is nil. This is why ‘conditional independence’ is their aim. As to the fear of violence and instability, the most honest of them will admit that their fear of radicalisation in Serbia is simply less than their fear of an Albanian uprising. As to the question of the probable eventual recog¬nition of the new state, they argue that while it would be preferable for this to be done via the Security Council, especially in light of the fact that Kosovo is now under UN jurisdiction, if Russia or China prevented this another route would have to be found. After all, the UN Security Council played no role in the recognition of the other states which emerged from the former Yugoslavia. According to Richard Caplan, in the likely case of Serbia opposing Kosovo’s recognition, ‘there will be ample opportunities for lawyers on both sides to exploit what is a rather ambiguous case’. Realities on the ground will be decisive. ‘Here, I think, politics will trump law.’
(Survival vol. 47 no. 4 Winter 2005–06 pp. 73–84)
For the last six years Kosovo has been run as protectorate of the United Nations. That chapter of its history is now coming to an end. Very soon – probably at least by December 2005 – talks should begin on the future status of this territory bitterly disputed between Serbs and Albanians. It is widely expected that, against the wishes of the government in Belgrade, Kosovo will be granted some form of ‘conditional independence’. Exactly what this means remains to be seen.
The roots of the Kosovo conflict lie in the fact that more than 90% of its two million people are ethnic Albanians.1 That Kosovo, within anyone’s living memory, has always had a high preponderance of Albanians made it a particular political problem within Yugoslavia. Since 1999, however, the link with Serbia has, in all but de jure terms, been severed. The likelihood that it can be restored seems fanciful to say the least.
In 1989 Serbia, under Slobodan Milosevic, abolished Kosovo’s autonomy. During the major Yugoslav wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo stayed quiet. In 1998, however, a guerrilla war broke out. Events escalated until NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign over what was then still known as Yugoslavia. After a period of frantic diplomacy Milosevic surrendered, Serbia pulled its forces out of Kosovo and much of the local administration collapsed. They were replaced by the UN and a NATO-led force called KFOR. This arrangement was blessed by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided the legal basis for the current situation in Kosovo. The resolution recognised the territorial integrity of what was then called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and instructed what was to become the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to promote, ‘pending a final settlement … substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo taking into full account … the Rambouillet Accords’.
The ill-fated Rambouillet meeting outside Paris preceded NATO’s bombardment of 1999. The Serbian side did not agree to the text it was asked to sign, one reason being that this document had foreseen that Kosovo’s future would, after three years, be decided ’on the basis of the will of the people’. The Serbs argued that since the Albanians were in favour of inde¬pendence, this phrase could only mean that they would lose their southern province, which they regard as the cradle of their civilisation. Thus, at its very heart, Resolution 1244 contained a contradiction – pitting the Kosovo majority’s right to self-determination against the equally valid legal prin¬ciple of the territorial integrity of states. Up to now it has been possible to avoid resolving this contradiction. Today, however, in the words of UNMIK head Søren Jessen-Petersen, Kosovo is facing ’its moment of truth’.
Since 1999 Kosovo has changed beyond recognition. The first and most obvious change is that there are no longer any Serbs in any of Kosovo’s major urban settlements, bar north Mitrovica, which is a divided city. The end of Serbian rule culminated in the flight and ethnic cleansing of large numbers of Serbs (and Roma), very few of whom have returned. Today one-third of the estimated 100,000 Serbs who remain in Kosovo live in Mitrovica and the overwhelmingly Serbian-inhabited north of Kosovo, which is contiguous with Serbia. The rest live in enclaves scattered throughout the rest of the province. Some of these need 24-hour military protection, as do Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries. Economically, Kosovo remains extremely weak and unemployment high, though reliable figures are hard to come by. Average wages are now around €200 a month and many families depend on remittances from the large Kosovo diaspora living and working abroad, especially in Western Europe.
Since 1999, the UN has set up a government structure in Kosovo. Powers are gradually being devolved to elected bodies and their ministries. Most Serbs boycott these institutions, either at the behest of the authorities in Belgrade or because they believe that on those occasions when they did participate, they were simply used in an Albanian effort to deceive the outside world into believing that a real multi-ethnic society was being built in Kosovo. The boycott is controversial, however. Some Serb leaders believe they have lost more than they have gained by staying outside of Kosovo’s structures.
In December 2003 UNMIK, together with the government of Kosovo, promulgated a list of so-called ‘Standards’ against which Kosovo’s progress could be measured, covering everything from rule of law to minority rights. At the same time the UN and other diplomats – adopting the slogan ‘Standards before Status’ – made clear that the issue of Kosovo’s final status was not on the agenda for the immediate future. In November 2003, however, the ‘Contact Group’ of main outside powers announced that if all went well, by the middle of 2005 a comprehensive review of standards would open the way for talks on the future status of the province. The irony is that talks may soon begin not because things went well, but because they went disastrously wrong. In March 2004 riots broke out in which some 4,000 Serbs and Roma were driven from their homes and 19 killed. It became starkly clear that the status quo was untenable and, if there was a new upsurge in violence, UNMIK might even collapse. Immediately after the riots UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called in a diplomat with considerable Balkan experience to lead an inquiry into what had caused them. The insights of this diplomat, Norwegian ambassador to NATO Kai Eide, helped convince Annan and many others that dangerous stagnation had set in; the only way to avoid a new conflagration was to give the impression that Kosovo was somehow moving forward and was not doomed to remain forever a forgotten, poverty-stricken corner of Europe.
Kosovo’s Albanian leaders either quickly understood, or were made to understand by diplomats and the foreign leaders that they met, that the riots had been disastrous for their international image. In December 2004, following elections, a new government came to power headed by former Kosovo Liberation Army commander Ramush Haradinaj. With much force and skill, Haradinaj moved to get Kosovo to live up to the Standards and even to reach out to the Serbs. Being a skilful premier was not enough, however, to stop allegations about his past catching up with him. In March 2005 he was indicted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague for war crimes dating back to 1998. With much dignity he resigned and departed but, contrary to expectations, Kosovo remained calm. In part this was because Albanian leaders understood that, if angry Kosovars began rampaging once again, the prospect of the comprehensive review would clearly diminish. This time they played their cards well and in June Kofi Annan invited Kai Eide back to begin the review.
Eide delivered his report on 4 October. Annan passed it on to the Security Council three days later, saying he accepted its recommendations. ‘The time has come’, said Annan, ’to move to the next phase of the political process.’ He added that he now intended to ’initiate preparations’ for the appointment of ‘a Special Envoy to lead the future status process.’ At the time of writing it was widely expected that he would choose Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president who played a key role in securing Milosevic’s agreement to the terms which ended NATO’s bombardment of Yugoslavia in 1999.
Eide’s most important point was that talks on the future status of Kosovo should begin. He was not asked to say what he thought the final status of Kosovo should be and, significantly, he uses the words ‘future status’ rather than ‘final status’. This implies, and indeed Eide in places explicitly says, that international involvement in the contested province will continue for many years. ’The international community must do the utmost to ensure that whatever the status becomes it does not become a “failed” status’, he writes. ’Entering the future status process does not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage in the process.’
Progress in meeting the Standards as a whole has been uneven, Eide says: ’regrettably, little has been achieved to create a foundation for a multi-ethnic society’. Talks should nevertheless begin, he says, because the momentum and expectations have built up; ’having moved from stagnation to expecta¬tion, stagnation cannot be allowed to take hold’.
Some of Eide’s recommendations may be carried out whatever the result of status talks. The EU, he argues, should play a prominent role, especially in police and judicial matters. NATO, too, will have to stay, with at least some contribution from the US ‘in order to provide a visible expression of [America’s] continued engagement’. Certain elements of the international presence in Bosnia should be copied for Kosovo. These include the role of the ‘high representative’, currently Britain’s Paddy Ashdown, who exer¬cises huge powers and can fire any elected official in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, Ashdown holds a kind of hybrid position – both ‘high representative’ of the intervening powers and international community, vaguely defined, but also the EU’s special representative to Bosnia. Eide suggests a similar arrangement for the post-UNMIK era in Kosovo: a high represenative with extraordinary powers in the field of inter-ethnic relations, but who is also ‘firmly anchored’ in the EU.
Regarding Kosovo’s Serbian minority, Eide argues in favour of an ’ambi¬tious decentralisation plan‘ which would give Kosovo Serbs competences ’in areas such as police, justice, education, culture, media and the economy’. He also recommends that what he terms ’protective space’ should be created around Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions and that ways should be found to place them ‘under a form of international protection’. He adds: ‘it is important not only to protect individual sites as cultural and religious monuments, but also living communities’.
Albanian and Serb reactions to the Eide report were mixed. Albanian leaders reacted exuberantly to the fact that it had recommended that talks begin, but initially said little about the content of the report. Although giving praise where praise was due, the report was largely damning about corruption and the majority’s treatment of the Serb minority. Reactions in Serbia were on the whole positive, although not without criticisms. If the Standards had not been met, asked some, then why was Eide recommending that talks begin? To a great extent this was empty rhetoric, since by the time the report was issued Belgrade and Pristina were already readying themselves for talks, or at least were supposed to be.
As late as June 2005, on the Serb side a degree of denial still prevailed. Officials in Belgrade described Serbia’s policy as anticipating that Kosovo could have ‘more than autonomy, but less than independence’. What this meant was unclear. Some officials, such as Aleksandar Simic, an adviser to Premier Vojislav Kostunica, said that this meant that although being autonomous, the future Kosovo would send back deputies to the parliament in Belgrade and play a full role in running the whole country.13 Serbia has a population of 7.5 million, as against some 2m for Kosovo. The forcible reincorporation of such a large number of implacably hostile Albanians into the Serbian body politic seemed so far from reality or in the interests of a stable Serbia that one could only wonder: had Serbian strategists, unable in the past six years to visit Kosovo at will, simply lost any grasp of the reality there?
By autumn 2005, however, a more realistic concept of what was possible was emerging. Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, the head of the Serbian government’s Coordination Centre for Kosovo, was saying that she envisaged the province having full autonomy in the judicial, executive and legislative fields but that defence, foreign affairs and sovereignty would remain in the hands of Serbia. Dusan Batakovic, a historian and diplomat with a deep knowledge of Kosovo, and now advisor to Serbian President Boris Tadic, elaborated on this: he did not expect that the Albanians would want to return to parliament in Belgrade, though this option remained. He also said that, in preparing for talks, he was gaming various scenarios of what might happen.
It seems unlikely that the Serbian idea of ‘more than autonomy but less than independence’ will gain support amongst the big powers who will help arbitrate Kosovo’s fate. However, the new position, despite the occasional nationalistic outburst, is expressed in the mild language of compromise; the Serbs claim they are trying to find a happy median between the Albanian desire for self-rule and their desire to defend Serbia’s territorial integrity. In private, some senior Serbian leaders say they believe that ‘conditional independence’ for Kosovo is inevitable, but they will nonetheless put up a fierce rearguard struggle to prevent it. No Serbian leader wants to go down in history as the one who lost Kosovo, so if this rearguard action succeeds in staving off independence during their watch – which is conceivable, if unlikely – they will regard the talks as a success.
In Pristina, preparations for talks lag far behind those of Belgrade. Publicly, everyone from President Ibrahim Rugova to Premier Bajram Kosumi says that they are willing to talk with the Serbs about everything except independence, which is non-negotiable. Pristina’s position, in other words, is the mirror image of Belgrade’s. This position is understandable from their point of view, but what seems alarming is the lack of prepara¬tion for any succession issues, in light of the experience of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Since 1999, for example, Serbia has not paid pensions to Albanian workers who had paid their contributions like other Yugoslav citizens. When Kosovo Albanian negotiators demand this money, the Serbs will retort that they have paid the interest on Kosovo’s interna¬tional debt for the last six years.
Indeed, diplomats in Pristina fret that the main Kosovan leaders are simply unprepared for talks and have been lulled, by talk of ‘conditional independence’, into a false sense of security. They do not seem to appreciate the threat, from their point of view, of the preparations being made by the Serbs.15 Indeed, Albanians recently were outraged when the International Telecommunications Union failed to quickly accede to a request from UNMIK to allot Kosovo an international direct-dialling code separate from Serbia’s. This was thanks to deft diplomacy on the part of Serbia, although the issue has not yet been finally settled.
Some skilled people will be at the coming talks, as part of a team already selected by Rugova. But the question is whether there are enough of them. The two best men on the team, not being major political figures, have the least clout. One is Blerim Shala, the editor of the daily Zeri, who has been asked to coordinate the team’s working groups; the other is Veton Surroi, the publisher and now leader of the small opposition party Ora. The rest of the team leave room for concern, quite apart from personal antipathies within the group. Nexhat Daci, the speaker of parliament, is widely regarded by diplomats who deal with Kosovo as an old-style, inflexible demagogue and by opposition leaders as unacceptably authoritarian. Next is Bajram Kosumi, the likeable but weak premier who succeeded Ramush Haradinaj. A whiff of scandal hangs over his premiership following allegations of corruption which appeared in the press. President Ibrahim Rugova is the best-known international symbol of Kosovo and his authority is unmatched. However, he has lung cancer and nobody knows how his health will hold up over the next few months. If he dies or is incapacitated soon this will provoke a major political upheaval as rival camps, which are already emerging, fight for the leadership of his Democratic League of Kosovo, the largest single party in Kosovo. His demise could also fatally weaken the Kosovo Albanian negoti¬ating team, as the others fight for a leadership role. Finally there is Hashim Thaci, the leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo, who used to be the political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army. All these men, bar Daci, participated in the Rambouillet negotiations.
At the time of writing the Eide report was awaiting examination by the Security Council. According to diplomatic sources, once this stage has been passed and Ahtisaari or someone else has been selected to lead the talks, three deputies – from the US, EU and Russia -- will be chosen. A period of shuttle diplomacy will begin, perhaps in December, and at some point in early 2006 the team could retire to write a draft agreement. While working groups of Serbs and Albanians may go over certain individual questions, the main negotiators will not yet meet. Indeed, a proposal which had been floated behind the scenes in late summer for a formal opening of talks was quashed on the grounds that both sides would then be obliged to state positions publicly, which would later reduce their room for manoeuvre and flexibility. According to Veton Surroi, a realistic scenario foresees the Serb and Albanian main negotiating teams summoned to meet around May 2006 ‘in a castle in Austria’. In January Austria takes over the presidency of the EU.
What happens next is impossible to predict. One scenario outlined by a senior diplomatic source foresees that the Serbian team will fight hard to make sure that the agreement contains all possible safeguards for the Kosovo Serbs, acknowledging its own interests and in institutionalising international protection for Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches.18 Having achieved this, the Serbs could then refuse to endorse the plan because it also points the way to Kosovo’s independence. Reluctantly, perhaps, the Albanians would then be compelled to accept more in terms of Serbian rights in Kosovo than they would have done otherwise, but under international pressure they might see such concessions as the price of independence.
At the same time Serbia’s leaders, none of whom want to take responsibility for losing Kosovo, could claim that, at this point and having fought as hard as possible, Kosovo was taken away from Serbia. Since Serbia did not give its consent, it will not recognise the emerging state and hence, as far as it is concerned, its status could (theoretically,) be reversed at a later date. If this is in fact how the situ¬ation develops, this Serb position will, sooner or later, have to be modified, if only as the price of EU membership – as recent quarrels over Turkey and the question of its recognition of Cyprus have demonstrated.
It is impossible to know in advance what the UN-led negotiating team might propose. But since the widespread assumption is that it will be some form of ‘conditional independence’, it is worth examining what this could mean. In broad terms it would certainly mean adopting some of the recom¬mendations discussed by Eide, but more specifically it may well be that the negotiators are guided by the blueprint of the International Commission on the Balkans. This independent group, which issued its report in April 2005, was chaired by former Italian Premier Giuliano Amato, and for the most part included people either from or with a deep knowledge and experience of the Balkans. They proposed that Kosovo should move towards independence in four stages. The first, ‘de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia’, seems to describe the current situation. The second is called ‘independence without full sovereignty’, which is described as meaning that Kosovo is an independent entity but not yet a sovereign state and one in which the international community ‘reserves powers in the fields of human rights and minorities’ – a theme which was echoed by Eide. The third stage is called ‘guided sovereignty’, and would ‘coincide with Kosovo’s recognition as a candidate for EU membership’ and in which the international community would lose its reserve powers which would be replaced by ‘influence through the negotiation process’. The fourth and final stage is called ‘full and final sovereignty’, and is marked by the ‘absorption of Kosovo into the EU and its adoption of the shared sover¬eignty to which all members are subject’.
The Serbs hope that it will not come to this, and with skilful diplomacy they might stand a slim chance of at least making the technical status of Kosovo somewhat vaguer and more drawn out than that described above. For this they would probably need vigorous support from Russia, however, and according to diplomatic sources the Russians have already decided to betray the Serbs.20 For the benefit of the Serbian press, Russian diplomats say that they will not accept any solution for Kosovo which is not endorsed by Belgrade, but to Western diplomats they are saying precisely the oppo¬site. It has always been widely assumed that Russia, citing the precedent of Chechnya, would oppose Kosovo’s independence. Now, however, three things seem to have happened. In 2003 Russian troops were withdrawn from the Balkans. This has dramatically lowered Russia’s diplomatic leverage in the region. Secondly, Russian diplomats have concluded that there is no realistic way to reconnect Kosovo and its hostile population to Belgrade. Thirdly, they have concluded, and indeed told visiting foreign ministers, that as far as they are concerned the question of precedent could be used to their advantage. That is to say, they are noting that if Kosovo can secede from a sovereign state, then the same argument can potentially be applied in areas of the former Soviet Union where they have interests, specifically Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Trans-Dniester in Moldova.
China is unlikely to resist the independence of Kosovo if Russia does not, although this cannot be taken for granted. While China has never taken an active role or even interest in the Balkans, it did veto the continuation of a UN peacekeeping force in Macedonia in 1999. The Serbs might succeed in persuading China that independence for Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent for Taiwan or even Tibet. Whatever the repercussions for Tibet, Serbian politicians argue that if Kosovo is granted some form of independence this would destabilise the region in a way they could not control. They argue, for example, that if they cannot prevent the loss of Kosovo, Serbia might succumb to a renewed wave of angry nationalism and the Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj, now on trial in The Hague on war-crimes charges, might come to power. This is conceivable. The Radicals are already the largest party in parlia¬ment, although they are not in government. Outside of Serbia’s borders, the Serbian argument runs, Kosovo’s independence would embolden Albanian nationalists in Macedonia, thus perhaps prompting the disintegration of that state, with its large Albanian minority. The Serb part of Bosnia would again raise its wartime demand to secede and join Serbia.
Diplomats who follow the region are of course well acquainted with this line of argument, which played a decisive role in the EU’s decision in October to begin talks with Serbia on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Diplomats openly said that they decided not to let the outstanding issue of Ratko Mladic, the fugitive Bosnian Serb wartime commander wanted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, stand in the way of the opening of negotiations. They are hoping that the good news of the conclusion of an agreement next year may help counteract the simultaneous bad news of the loss of Kosovo and likely secession of Montenegro from the loose federation which currently links it to Serbia.
Albanians counter these arguments about radicalisation in Serbia with the argument that, unless they get independence, it is certain that hardliners will again resort to arms; in the ensuing uprising KFOR and representa¬tives of the international community present in Kosovo will be targeted. UN vehicles are already targets of the occasional bomb.
In the shorter term there is another threat. Over the last few months, Albin Kurti, a 30-year-old former student leader and political prisoner, has been organising young people across Kosovo. Studying the techniques used by those who organised the overthrow of former regimes in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, Kurti wants to ready his people to come out in protest against the talks on Kosovo’s future status.
Kurti says that talks, by their very nature, aim at compromise and there can be no compromise on Kosovo’s independence. He fears that what he calls Kosovo’s ‘corrupt’ politicians might yet buckle on this if put under pres¬sure. He argues that talks with Serbia should only take place when Kosovo is already independent and thus can sit at the table as an equal. His slogan – ‘No negotiations! Self Determination!’ – already decorates walls across Kosovo but his strength is, as yet, untested. If, however, at some point in the near future or during talks one of the Albanian leaders, for example Hashim Thaci, decided to ‘play the Kurti card’ and swing his support behind him then the outcome would be not only unpredictable but in such an unstable and highly charged situation a fresh wave of anti-Serbian ethnic cleansing similar to that of March 2004 might break out.
Diplomats who deal with Kosovo all repeat the mantra that they have no preconceived agenda, beyond wanting to prohibit the physical partition of Kosovo or a possible future union with Albania, and that they want Serbs and Albanians to reach agreement on the territory’s future among themselves. All of them know, however, and admit in private, that the likelihood of this happening is nil. This is why ‘conditional independence’ is their aim. As to the fear of violence and instability, the most honest of them will admit that their fear of radicalisation in Serbia is simply less than their fear of an Albanian uprising. As to the question of the probable eventual recog¬nition of the new state, they argue that while it would be preferable for this to be done via the Security Council, especially in light of the fact that Kosovo is now under UN jurisdiction, if Russia or China prevented this another route would have to be found. After all, the UN Security Council played no role in the recognition of the other states which emerged from the former Yugoslavia. According to Richard Caplan, in the likely case of Serbia opposing Kosovo’s recognition, ‘there will be ample opportunities for lawyers on both sides to exploit what is a rather ambiguous case’. Realities on the ground will be decisive. ‘Here, I think, politics will trump law.’
Albanians in south Serbia to demand same rights as Kosovo Serbs, says leader
Excerpt from report by Serbian independent news agency FoNet
Presevo, 25 December: Albanians in southern Serbia will advocate a stance that Kosovo Serbs should be granted as many rights as possible, so that they could ask for the same rights themselves, Presevo Speaker Ragmi Mustafa, who is also Presevo Mayor-designate and chairman of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DUA), told FoNet today.
Mustafa recalled that representatives of all political parties that rally Albanians in southern Serbia decided at a meeting with a Kosovo delegation [for Kosovo status talks] member, Veton Suroi, which was held some 10 days ago at the Kosovo Assembly, that he should represent them.
Suroi will be "the Presevo Valley ambassador" in these talks. "We will ask, through Suroi, that Albanians in the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, as well as Kosovo Serbs, be granted full rights,", Mustafa said.
Albanians will, as he said, ask for the rights in the sphere of education to be improved, as well as for economy to develop, for the right to use national symbols, demilitarization of the region and its decentralization.
[Passage omitted: more on previously covered details]
He said that Albanians' decision to stay and live in Serbia "will depend on the outcome of talks between Pristina and Belgrade and the realization of Serbs' demands in Kosovo".
"Albanians in the Presevo Valley will have the same demands as Serbs in Kosovo," Mustafa said.
Source: FoNet news agency, Belgrade, in Serbian 1451 gmt 25 Dec 05
Presevo, 25 December: Albanians in southern Serbia will advocate a stance that Kosovo Serbs should be granted as many rights as possible, so that they could ask for the same rights themselves, Presevo Speaker Ragmi Mustafa, who is also Presevo Mayor-designate and chairman of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DUA), told FoNet today.
Mustafa recalled that representatives of all political parties that rally Albanians in southern Serbia decided at a meeting with a Kosovo delegation [for Kosovo status talks] member, Veton Suroi, which was held some 10 days ago at the Kosovo Assembly, that he should represent them.
Suroi will be "the Presevo Valley ambassador" in these talks. "We will ask, through Suroi, that Albanians in the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, as well as Kosovo Serbs, be granted full rights,", Mustafa said.
Albanians will, as he said, ask for the rights in the sphere of education to be improved, as well as for economy to develop, for the right to use national symbols, demilitarization of the region and its decentralization.
[Passage omitted: more on previously covered details]
He said that Albanians' decision to stay and live in Serbia "will depend on the outcome of talks between Pristina and Belgrade and the realization of Serbs' demands in Kosovo".
"Albanians in the Presevo Valley will have the same demands as Serbs in Kosovo," Mustafa said.
Source: FoNet news agency, Belgrade, in Serbian 1451 gmt 25 Dec 05
Saturday, December 24, 2005
Kosovo 'domino effect’ no longer genuine issue
ISN Security Watch’s Igor Jovanovic talks to Balkan expert Dr. James Lyon, the Serbia project director for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) think tank, who says independence is the most “workable” option for Kosovo and is not likely to lead to regional instability.
ISN Security Watch: The ICG recently said Kosovo’s potential independence would contribute to stability in the region. However, would that independence stir similar demands from Albanians in Macedonia, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Hungarians in Serbia’s Vojvodina province? Is an independent Kosovo a potential danger for further disintegration in the region?
DR. JAMES LYON: We have discussed this question in many of our reports over the previous five years. In spite of the desire of some inside Belgrade to push the idea that Kosovo independence would have a spill-over effect in other areas of the Balkans, we have been unable to identify such a potential. However, the Balkans have changed in the last five years, and the threats to regional security and stability are no longer the same. First and most noticeably, the “domino effect” is no longer a genuine issue.
Bosnia and Herzegovina - although still fragile - is for the first time since 1995 seeing significant progress in its internal politics, with Bosnian politicians beginning to shoulder some of the responsibility for change, as opposed to shrugging it off onto the international community. Their recent agreements on police and state-level constitutional reforms suggest they have concluded that the stakes for European integration are too high to continue digging in their heels on the nationalist agenda.
Most importantly, there is no direct parallel between Kosovo and the Serb-inhabited areas of Bosnia. The Republika Srpska [Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity] was founded on genocide and ethnic cleansing; although it was legitimized as a sub-state entity by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement [which ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia], it has no justifiable claim as a potential sovereign state. At present, only Belgrade seems interested in mentioning a possible partition of Bosnia. Banja Luka [the Republika Srpska capital] is silent on the matter.
Similarly, Macedonia is quite different from what it was when conflict broke out in 2001 and had to be contained by the international community. The country appears to have resolved its internal differences in a manner that will permit it to continue to make progress towards the EU. A positive recommendation from the European Commission on its membership application is on the agenda of the European Council’s mid-December meeting. Fears of a “domino effect” from Montenegrin independence no longer stand up to serious scrutiny.
For that matter, [the Serbian province of] Vojvodina is an area that should remain peaceful, provided Belgrade does not curtail the rights of the province’s ethnic minorities [mainly ethnic Hungarians]. Belgrade also needs to crack down on the numerous anti-minority incidents inspired by the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] and other factions close to the Orthodox Church. If it does this, Vojvodina should remain a non-issue.
SECURITY WATCH: The Kosovo society has not demonstrated tolerance toward minorities over the past six years. During that time, several dozens of Serbs were killed, around 150 Orthodox churches were torn down or destroyed and a very small number of non-Albanian refugees returned to their homes. Do you think the treatment of minorities can change if Kosovo gains independence?
LYON: At present, the Kosovo Albanians view the Serb presence as an obstacle to achieving their independence aspirations. They view Serbs as agents of the Serbian state that for so long repressed them and conducted an official policy of state terror against them. As long as Kosovo’s status is unresolved, the Albanians will treat them as an unwelcome foreign organism that represents policies of a Greater Serbia. When Kosovo’s status is resolved in favor of independence, then it will be logical to expect that the Albanian majority will no longer view the Serb minority as a threat. Are your numbers correct on the churches?
SECURITY WATCH: How could Kosovo’s possible independence affect the political situation inside Serbia? Would it bring on the threat of radical parties coming to power?
Kosovo independence should have little effect on long-term political trends inside Serbia. The failure of Serbia’s “democrats” to remove [former Serbian president Slobodan] Milosevic-era structures and counter the Milosevic-era propaganda are the biggest threats to the development of democracy in Serbia. Unfortunately, after deposing Milosevic, many of these democrats then proceeded to defend his policies regarding ethnic minorities, the wars of the 1990s, and Serbia’s relations with its neighbors. The result is that the Serbian Radical Party already exercises significant informal [power] within the current government and the country. Because many of the “democrats” bought into Milosevic’s interpretation of events and policies, they laid the groundwork for the rise of the Radicals. There is little the international community can do to combat this, other than opt for a strategy of containment.
SECURITY WATCH: Do you think Kosovo could survive as an independent state?
LYON: Of course.
SECURITY WATCH: Possible violence against Serbs, the same as back on 17 March 2004, is given as an argument backing Kosovo’s independence. Can violence serve as an argument for granting Kosovo independence?
LYON: The argument is that the current status of Kosovo is so unworkable and unable to create a stable economic, social, and political situation, that a new status must be found. Of all the available options, independence is the most workable.
SECURITY WATCH: When do you expect the final status of Kosovo to be resolved? How do you expect the situation to unravel if the Serbian authorities refuse to sign such a resolution?
LYON: The final status of Kosovo will probably be decided sometime in 2006. It is widely expected that Belgrade will refuse any outcome that gives independence to Kosovo. Should Belgrade refuse to sign off, independence will proceed without Serbia, which could have negative repercussions for Kosovo’s Serbian minority and give them far fewer privileges than should Belgrade participate. In any event, Kosovo will be offered a highly conditional road map that leads towards independence. Should Belgrade not participate in the process, the process will go ahead nonetheless.
SECURITY WATCH: Should Serbia get some concessions if Kosovo becomes independent, primarily concerning the tempo of accession to the EU?
LYON: Serbia could perhaps be given a speed-up on achieving candidate status. However, given the current climate inside the EU, this is not likely. There should not be - and probably will not be - any concessions on meeting membership requirements.
Igor Jovanovic is ISN Security Watch’s senior correspondent in Serbia.
ISN Security Watch: The ICG recently said Kosovo’s potential independence would contribute to stability in the region. However, would that independence stir similar demands from Albanians in Macedonia, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Hungarians in Serbia’s Vojvodina province? Is an independent Kosovo a potential danger for further disintegration in the region?
DR. JAMES LYON: We have discussed this question in many of our reports over the previous five years. In spite of the desire of some inside Belgrade to push the idea that Kosovo independence would have a spill-over effect in other areas of the Balkans, we have been unable to identify such a potential. However, the Balkans have changed in the last five years, and the threats to regional security and stability are no longer the same. First and most noticeably, the “domino effect” is no longer a genuine issue.
Bosnia and Herzegovina - although still fragile - is for the first time since 1995 seeing significant progress in its internal politics, with Bosnian politicians beginning to shoulder some of the responsibility for change, as opposed to shrugging it off onto the international community. Their recent agreements on police and state-level constitutional reforms suggest they have concluded that the stakes for European integration are too high to continue digging in their heels on the nationalist agenda.
Most importantly, there is no direct parallel between Kosovo and the Serb-inhabited areas of Bosnia. The Republika Srpska [Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity] was founded on genocide and ethnic cleansing; although it was legitimized as a sub-state entity by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement [which ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia], it has no justifiable claim as a potential sovereign state. At present, only Belgrade seems interested in mentioning a possible partition of Bosnia. Banja Luka [the Republika Srpska capital] is silent on the matter.
Similarly, Macedonia is quite different from what it was when conflict broke out in 2001 and had to be contained by the international community. The country appears to have resolved its internal differences in a manner that will permit it to continue to make progress towards the EU. A positive recommendation from the European Commission on its membership application is on the agenda of the European Council’s mid-December meeting. Fears of a “domino effect” from Montenegrin independence no longer stand up to serious scrutiny.
For that matter, [the Serbian province of] Vojvodina is an area that should remain peaceful, provided Belgrade does not curtail the rights of the province’s ethnic minorities [mainly ethnic Hungarians]. Belgrade also needs to crack down on the numerous anti-minority incidents inspired by the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] and other factions close to the Orthodox Church. If it does this, Vojvodina should remain a non-issue.
SECURITY WATCH: The Kosovo society has not demonstrated tolerance toward minorities over the past six years. During that time, several dozens of Serbs were killed, around 150 Orthodox churches were torn down or destroyed and a very small number of non-Albanian refugees returned to their homes. Do you think the treatment of minorities can change if Kosovo gains independence?
LYON: At present, the Kosovo Albanians view the Serb presence as an obstacle to achieving their independence aspirations. They view Serbs as agents of the Serbian state that for so long repressed them and conducted an official policy of state terror against them. As long as Kosovo’s status is unresolved, the Albanians will treat them as an unwelcome foreign organism that represents policies of a Greater Serbia. When Kosovo’s status is resolved in favor of independence, then it will be logical to expect that the Albanian majority will no longer view the Serb minority as a threat. Are your numbers correct on the churches?
SECURITY WATCH: How could Kosovo’s possible independence affect the political situation inside Serbia? Would it bring on the threat of radical parties coming to power?
Kosovo independence should have little effect on long-term political trends inside Serbia. The failure of Serbia’s “democrats” to remove [former Serbian president Slobodan] Milosevic-era structures and counter the Milosevic-era propaganda are the biggest threats to the development of democracy in Serbia. Unfortunately, after deposing Milosevic, many of these democrats then proceeded to defend his policies regarding ethnic minorities, the wars of the 1990s, and Serbia’s relations with its neighbors. The result is that the Serbian Radical Party already exercises significant informal [power] within the current government and the country. Because many of the “democrats” bought into Milosevic’s interpretation of events and policies, they laid the groundwork for the rise of the Radicals. There is little the international community can do to combat this, other than opt for a strategy of containment.
SECURITY WATCH: Do you think Kosovo could survive as an independent state?
LYON: Of course.
SECURITY WATCH: Possible violence against Serbs, the same as back on 17 March 2004, is given as an argument backing Kosovo’s independence. Can violence serve as an argument for granting Kosovo independence?
LYON: The argument is that the current status of Kosovo is so unworkable and unable to create a stable economic, social, and political situation, that a new status must be found. Of all the available options, independence is the most workable.
SECURITY WATCH: When do you expect the final status of Kosovo to be resolved? How do you expect the situation to unravel if the Serbian authorities refuse to sign such a resolution?
LYON: The final status of Kosovo will probably be decided sometime in 2006. It is widely expected that Belgrade will refuse any outcome that gives independence to Kosovo. Should Belgrade refuse to sign off, independence will proceed without Serbia, which could have negative repercussions for Kosovo’s Serbian minority and give them far fewer privileges than should Belgrade participate. In any event, Kosovo will be offered a highly conditional road map that leads towards independence. Should Belgrade not participate in the process, the process will go ahead nonetheless.
SECURITY WATCH: Should Serbia get some concessions if Kosovo becomes independent, primarily concerning the tempo of accession to the EU?
LYON: Serbia could perhaps be given a speed-up on achieving candidate status. However, given the current climate inside the EU, this is not likely. There should not be - and probably will not be - any concessions on meeting membership requirements.
Igor Jovanovic is ISN Security Watch’s senior correspondent in Serbia.
Kosovo: Behind-the-scenes hard talk begins
As both formal and informal behind-the-scenes talks about Kosovo’s future status begin, the member countries of the powerful Contact Group seem to have reached a consensus that Kosovo should be granted “conditional independence”.
By Tim Judah in London and Paris for ISN Security Watch (24/12/05)
Though UN officials have recently announced that talks concerning the status of Serbia’s UN-administered province of Kosovo would begin in earnest in January, ISN Security Watch has learned that much of the real work is already being done behind the scenes, with intense discussions between key countries involved in the region and Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders.
Over the past few weeks, a series of meetings, both formal and informal, have taken place in key capitals - including the Serbian capital, Belgrade, and the Kosovo capital, Pristina - as diplomats attempt to shape a deal for Kosovo, bolstering the work being done by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who has been chosen to head the UN-led status negotiations.
Since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the province of some two million people has been under the jurisdiction of the UN, though it legally remains a part of Serbia. Its population is over 90 per cent ethnic Albanian. They have made it clear they want nothing less than full independence for Kosovo.
Serbia’s official position is that Kosovo can have “more than autonomy but less than independence”.
Members of the Serbian negotiation team, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and President Boris Tadic, had proposed earlier this month that Kosovo be divided into Albanian and Serbian areas.
According to the Serbian plan, the Albanian areas would be self-governing and independent in all but name, while the Serbian ones would remain linked to Belgrade and the Serbian flag would fly once again on Kosovo’s frontiers.
In parallel to this, the Serbian leadership has also decided that it would be most advantageous to argue their Kosovo case along legal lines - that is to say that Kosovo is de jure part of Serbia and thus its international frontiers cannot be changed without Serbia’s consent.
However, Kosovo’s Albanian leaders are demanding that the province be given full independence in recognition of their right to self-determination.
Over the last few weeks, there have been several meetings - including one between the Contact Group, which was set up to coordinate policy during the Balkan wars in the early 1990s, and Ahtisaari - which have yielded significant results. While Ahtisaari is now the official Kosovo mediator, real power lies with the countries of the Contact Group.
There appears to be a considerable unity of purpose among the Contact Group members. France and the US, for example, so often at loggerheads over the past few years, have no major disagreement over Kosovo. Russia, too, has been described by diplomats as extremely cooperative over Kosovo. If Serbian leaders were hoping to find backing from the traditionally friendly Russians there is no evidence thus far that they will get it.
Representatives of the Contact Group countries have decided that the best solution for Kosovo is that it be given so called “conditional independence”.
This means that the sovereign link with Serbia will be broken but that restrictions on Kosovo’s independence will remain for a transitional period. These could include, for example, no army and awarding reserve powers to a representative of the international community. The result would be a slimmed down and more focused version of the model that exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is effectively governed by the international community’s High Representative, who has sweeping powers.
Diplomats who have talked to ISN Security Watch, on condition of anonymity, say the only disagreement among the Contact Group members is over speed and tactics.
“We all know, more or less, where we are going but we just have to be careful of the language used in public,” one source said.
At the moment, officials from Contact Group countries say publicly that what they want is an agreement made between and mutually acceptable to Serbs and Albanians. Yet, privately, everyone knows that Serbs and Albanians will never be able to agree on the status of Kosovo.
France is less willing to openly say that the Contact Group countries are in favor of conditional independence because it fears that to do so might prompt the Serbs to withdraw from talks before they have even properly started.
By contrast, the British believe that the sooner the “I” word (for independence) is pronounced, the more flexible the Albanians will become. The British theory, according to informed sources, is that given a guarantee that independence (conditional or otherwise) is coming, the Albanians will be more amenable to granting the Kosovo Serbs concessions such as extensive decentralization.
As to whether moving Kosovo towards independence might provoke a nationalist radicalization of Serbia, one source in favor of moving faster rather than slower, simply sums up the Serbian dilemma as one of “Belarus or Brussels”. That is to say that Serbia has a choice between renewed isolation or continuing along its current path towards European integration.
It is clear to Serbian leaders that US policymakers have little sympathy for the Serbian efforts to keep Kosovo. However, what is unclear is that there appears to be no compelling reason (other than realpolitik,) as to why the US should favor independence for the Kosovo Albanians but oppose it for Iraqi Kurds, for instance.
Serbs have looked for support in meetings in Moscow and with the French. The Russians, while promising Serbian leaders that they would oppose anything Belgrade does not agree with, say in private talks with their western counterparts that they will not oppose conditional independence for Kosovo.
France then was perhaps the last best hope for the Serbian leadership, but here too, in a series of meetings this month, the Serbs have been disappointed. According to ISN Security Watch sources, the Serbs were told that France would support Serbian interests but that those interests had to be realistic. Holding on to Kosovo, in any form, was not considered realistic.
In public and private, the Serbs are now pursuing different lines of attack. Predrag Simic, Serbia and Montenegro’s ambassador to France and a member of the Serbian Kosovo negotiating team, evokes the situation leading up to the Second World War to argue against independence for Kosovo.
“In 1938,” he says, the Western powers, fearful of Hitler, accepted his demand to annex the Sudetenland, the predominantly German inhabited area of Czechoslovakia. But this appeasement “brought neither peace nor security to Europe”.
However, in private, according to western diplomatic sources, Serbian President Tadic is exploring a more flexible agenda. He wants any settlement to secure the future of the Kosovo Serbs and wants to try and steer proponents of conditional independence into making sure that if this cannot be avoided then, at least for the foreseeable future, Kosovo will have no army or highly symbolic seat at the UN.
But Western diplomats are fearful of what they call the “disaster scenario”, which foresees the talks failing to gain traction and hardliners on either side opting for violence.
The disaster scenario sees either Serbian or Albanian hardliners provoking an exodus from the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo. There are some100,000 Serbs in Kosovo, of which 30,000 live in the solidly Serbian north, while the rest are scattered in enclaves in central and southern Kosovo.
Albanian hardliners could decide to attack the enclaves and provoke the flight of the Serbs there, so as to prevent the areas from becoming autonomous regions that would remain, in their view, like Serbian claws in a future independent Kosovo.
By contrast Serbian hardliners could seek to provoke a Serbian exodus from the enclaves in a bid to solidify the Serbian population of the north. Their hope would be that many years down the line the de facto partition that already exists along the Ibar river would one day be recognized as the international frontier between the part of Kosovo that Serbia managed to save and the Albanian part, which would be independent.
It is precisely because they want to avert such a disaster scenario that the diplomats are now talking intensively to the Serbs and Albanians and among themselves.
Indeed, the message diplomats are now delivering to the Kosovo Albanians might come as a surprise to some. According to one source, the Albanians have been warned not to let hardliners provoke violence, but they have also been told that since conditional independence is the aim, “The talks are not about the status of Kosovo. What they are really about then, is negotiating the status of the Serbs in Kosovo,” the source said.
Tim Judah is the author of Kosovo: War and Revenge and The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, both published by Yale University Press.
By Tim Judah in London and Paris for ISN Security Watch (24/12/05)
Though UN officials have recently announced that talks concerning the status of Serbia’s UN-administered province of Kosovo would begin in earnest in January, ISN Security Watch has learned that much of the real work is already being done behind the scenes, with intense discussions between key countries involved in the region and Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders.
Over the past few weeks, a series of meetings, both formal and informal, have taken place in key capitals - including the Serbian capital, Belgrade, and the Kosovo capital, Pristina - as diplomats attempt to shape a deal for Kosovo, bolstering the work being done by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who has been chosen to head the UN-led status negotiations.
Since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the province of some two million people has been under the jurisdiction of the UN, though it legally remains a part of Serbia. Its population is over 90 per cent ethnic Albanian. They have made it clear they want nothing less than full independence for Kosovo.
Serbia’s official position is that Kosovo can have “more than autonomy but less than independence”.
Members of the Serbian negotiation team, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and President Boris Tadic, had proposed earlier this month that Kosovo be divided into Albanian and Serbian areas.
According to the Serbian plan, the Albanian areas would be self-governing and independent in all but name, while the Serbian ones would remain linked to Belgrade and the Serbian flag would fly once again on Kosovo’s frontiers.
In parallel to this, the Serbian leadership has also decided that it would be most advantageous to argue their Kosovo case along legal lines - that is to say that Kosovo is de jure part of Serbia and thus its international frontiers cannot be changed without Serbia’s consent.
However, Kosovo’s Albanian leaders are demanding that the province be given full independence in recognition of their right to self-determination.
Over the last few weeks, there have been several meetings - including one between the Contact Group, which was set up to coordinate policy during the Balkan wars in the early 1990s, and Ahtisaari - which have yielded significant results. While Ahtisaari is now the official Kosovo mediator, real power lies with the countries of the Contact Group.
There appears to be a considerable unity of purpose among the Contact Group members. France and the US, for example, so often at loggerheads over the past few years, have no major disagreement over Kosovo. Russia, too, has been described by diplomats as extremely cooperative over Kosovo. If Serbian leaders were hoping to find backing from the traditionally friendly Russians there is no evidence thus far that they will get it.
Representatives of the Contact Group countries have decided that the best solution for Kosovo is that it be given so called “conditional independence”.
This means that the sovereign link with Serbia will be broken but that restrictions on Kosovo’s independence will remain for a transitional period. These could include, for example, no army and awarding reserve powers to a representative of the international community. The result would be a slimmed down and more focused version of the model that exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is effectively governed by the international community’s High Representative, who has sweeping powers.
Diplomats who have talked to ISN Security Watch, on condition of anonymity, say the only disagreement among the Contact Group members is over speed and tactics.
“We all know, more or less, where we are going but we just have to be careful of the language used in public,” one source said.
At the moment, officials from Contact Group countries say publicly that what they want is an agreement made between and mutually acceptable to Serbs and Albanians. Yet, privately, everyone knows that Serbs and Albanians will never be able to agree on the status of Kosovo.
France is less willing to openly say that the Contact Group countries are in favor of conditional independence because it fears that to do so might prompt the Serbs to withdraw from talks before they have even properly started.
By contrast, the British believe that the sooner the “I” word (for independence) is pronounced, the more flexible the Albanians will become. The British theory, according to informed sources, is that given a guarantee that independence (conditional or otherwise) is coming, the Albanians will be more amenable to granting the Kosovo Serbs concessions such as extensive decentralization.
As to whether moving Kosovo towards independence might provoke a nationalist radicalization of Serbia, one source in favor of moving faster rather than slower, simply sums up the Serbian dilemma as one of “Belarus or Brussels”. That is to say that Serbia has a choice between renewed isolation or continuing along its current path towards European integration.
It is clear to Serbian leaders that US policymakers have little sympathy for the Serbian efforts to keep Kosovo. However, what is unclear is that there appears to be no compelling reason (other than realpolitik,) as to why the US should favor independence for the Kosovo Albanians but oppose it for Iraqi Kurds, for instance.
Serbs have looked for support in meetings in Moscow and with the French. The Russians, while promising Serbian leaders that they would oppose anything Belgrade does not agree with, say in private talks with their western counterparts that they will not oppose conditional independence for Kosovo.
France then was perhaps the last best hope for the Serbian leadership, but here too, in a series of meetings this month, the Serbs have been disappointed. According to ISN Security Watch sources, the Serbs were told that France would support Serbian interests but that those interests had to be realistic. Holding on to Kosovo, in any form, was not considered realistic.
In public and private, the Serbs are now pursuing different lines of attack. Predrag Simic, Serbia and Montenegro’s ambassador to France and a member of the Serbian Kosovo negotiating team, evokes the situation leading up to the Second World War to argue against independence for Kosovo.
“In 1938,” he says, the Western powers, fearful of Hitler, accepted his demand to annex the Sudetenland, the predominantly German inhabited area of Czechoslovakia. But this appeasement “brought neither peace nor security to Europe”.
However, in private, according to western diplomatic sources, Serbian President Tadic is exploring a more flexible agenda. He wants any settlement to secure the future of the Kosovo Serbs and wants to try and steer proponents of conditional independence into making sure that if this cannot be avoided then, at least for the foreseeable future, Kosovo will have no army or highly symbolic seat at the UN.
But Western diplomats are fearful of what they call the “disaster scenario”, which foresees the talks failing to gain traction and hardliners on either side opting for violence.
The disaster scenario sees either Serbian or Albanian hardliners provoking an exodus from the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo. There are some100,000 Serbs in Kosovo, of which 30,000 live in the solidly Serbian north, while the rest are scattered in enclaves in central and southern Kosovo.
Albanian hardliners could decide to attack the enclaves and provoke the flight of the Serbs there, so as to prevent the areas from becoming autonomous regions that would remain, in their view, like Serbian claws in a future independent Kosovo.
By contrast Serbian hardliners could seek to provoke a Serbian exodus from the enclaves in a bid to solidify the Serbian population of the north. Their hope would be that many years down the line the de facto partition that already exists along the Ibar river would one day be recognized as the international frontier between the part of Kosovo that Serbia managed to save and the Albanian part, which would be independent.
It is precisely because they want to avert such a disaster scenario that the diplomats are now talking intensively to the Serbs and Albanians and among themselves.
Indeed, the message diplomats are now delivering to the Kosovo Albanians might come as a surprise to some. According to one source, the Albanians have been warned not to let hardliners provoke violence, but they have also been told that since conditional independence is the aim, “The talks are not about the status of Kosovo. What they are really about then, is negotiating the status of the Serbs in Kosovo,” the source said.
Tim Judah is the author of Kosovo: War and Revenge and The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, both published by Yale University Press.
Friday, December 23, 2005
Goldberg: US will keep supporting Kosovo (dailies)
All daily newspapers cover the meeting that US Head of Office Philip Goldberg had yesterday with Assembly Speaker Nexhat Daci. Zëri quotes Goldberg on the front page as saying that the US will be with Kosovo during the process of status resolution. On the other hand, Koha Ditore reports that Goldberg is disappointed over the non-inclusion of Kosovo Serb representatives in the Assembly. “One of my greatest disappointments ever since I came here is that the majority of Serb representatives have not attended the sessions of the Assembly,” he said.
Koha Ditore also quotes Goldberg as saying that in 2005, the Assembly has played a strong and constructive role in passing laws, which was necessary to enable work in standards implementation.
In Epoka e Re Goldberg is quoted as saying that 2005 is a historical year for Kosovo.
Assembly Speaker Daci said that the most essential thing is that Kosovo is on the right path toward status resolution and has the needed international support.
Koha Ditore also quotes Goldberg as saying that in 2005, the Assembly has played a strong and constructive role in passing laws, which was necessary to enable work in standards implementation.
In Epoka e Re Goldberg is quoted as saying that 2005 is a historical year for Kosovo.
Assembly Speaker Daci said that the most essential thing is that Kosovo is on the right path toward status resolution and has the needed international support.
Thursday, December 22, 2005
What remains to be done in the Balkans
Walter Kälin International Herald Tribune
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2005
GENEVA
Ten years after the Dayton accord brought an end to the worst fighting Western Europe had witnessed since the World War II, there is much to celebrate. Peace has come to the Balkans, and the insidious results of ethnic cleansing have largely been reversed. Two and a half million refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to their homes, at least half to areas where they are an ethnic minority.
Nevertheless, the scars of war are far from healed. Much remains to be done before the Dayton accords can truly be considered a success. As the UN secretary general's representative on the human rights of internally displaced persons, I recently undertook a mission to the region. I left with mixed feelings.
In Croatia, many houses and apartments have been returned to their original owners. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, economic and political ties have been growing among Muslim, Croat and Serb communities, and almost all property has been restored to its rightful owners. Serbia and Montenegro have made huge efforts to accommodate the remaining 500,000 refugees and almost 250,000 displaced persons, straining their already faltering economies.
But some of the emotional scars I witnessed may be too deep to heal.
I met survivors of the Srebrenica massacre. They had returned to the villages close by, but many looked far older than their years, and without hope or courage for their future.
In Northern Mitrovica, in Kosovo, I visited Roma camps that had been hastily erected in areas that proved to be poisoned by lead. Three years after the first tests, the inhabitants had still not been evacuated, although the environment constitutes a serious threat to their health and to the lives of their children.
People from different ethnic groups still discriminate against each other. Throughout the Balkans, returnees can still expect prolonged and unjustifiable delays in having their houses connected to water and electricity. They are discriminated against when applying for jobs and are denied access to pension funds and the state health system.
Too little is done so that returnees' children can go to a school in their own language. In many places the police are perceived as biased. National and religious symbols are not used to create unity but to feed divisions and insecurity among minorities. And the overburdened and cumbersome judiciary systems are not able to enforce a strong rule of law.
The failure, moreover, to bring to justice thousands of people suspected of war crimes, in particular Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, who helped orchestrate ethnically motivated mass expulsions, continues to cast a pall over the progress made and has done nothing to reduce fears and insecurity.
There are still almost 500,000 internally displaced persons as a result of the Balkan wars. Thousands live miserably in ramshackle collective centers or "informal settlements" that were never intended to become permanent housing. Many of them have no place to go and are incapable of living on their own.
The international community has wound down its financial and political support for the region. There are no funds left to rehabilitate living conditions and find solutions for the most vulnerable among the refugees and internally displaced. There are no means to give 5,000 survivors the psycho-social care that would make their lives less of a living hell.
Several steps are needed urgently in the Balkans. First, there must be an immediate, concerted effort to find solutions for the most vulnerable people still in collective shelters - particularly the Roma in Northern Mitrovica.
Second, help must be extended to those who prefer to integrate locally, so that they have access to jobs and public services.
Third, efforts must be made to better inform displaced persons and minorities about their rights, to simplify administrative rules so they can claim their entitlements, and to halt discriminatory practices against them.
Fourth, donor governments and the World Bank should be encouraged to invest in rebuilding schools, health facilities, housing and other infrastructure, so that displaced persons and returnees begin to lead normal lives.
Finally, all crimes and acts of violence against the displaced and those returning must be investigated and prosecuted. Only then will the promise of Dayton be fully realized.
Walter Kälin is the representative of the UN secretary general on the human rights of internally displaced persons.
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2005
GENEVA
Ten years after the Dayton accord brought an end to the worst fighting Western Europe had witnessed since the World War II, there is much to celebrate. Peace has come to the Balkans, and the insidious results of ethnic cleansing have largely been reversed. Two and a half million refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to their homes, at least half to areas where they are an ethnic minority.
Nevertheless, the scars of war are far from healed. Much remains to be done before the Dayton accords can truly be considered a success. As the UN secretary general's representative on the human rights of internally displaced persons, I recently undertook a mission to the region. I left with mixed feelings.
In Croatia, many houses and apartments have been returned to their original owners. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, economic and political ties have been growing among Muslim, Croat and Serb communities, and almost all property has been restored to its rightful owners. Serbia and Montenegro have made huge efforts to accommodate the remaining 500,000 refugees and almost 250,000 displaced persons, straining their already faltering economies.
But some of the emotional scars I witnessed may be too deep to heal.
I met survivors of the Srebrenica massacre. They had returned to the villages close by, but many looked far older than their years, and without hope or courage for their future.
In Northern Mitrovica, in Kosovo, I visited Roma camps that had been hastily erected in areas that proved to be poisoned by lead. Three years after the first tests, the inhabitants had still not been evacuated, although the environment constitutes a serious threat to their health and to the lives of their children.
People from different ethnic groups still discriminate against each other. Throughout the Balkans, returnees can still expect prolonged and unjustifiable delays in having their houses connected to water and electricity. They are discriminated against when applying for jobs and are denied access to pension funds and the state health system.
Too little is done so that returnees' children can go to a school in their own language. In many places the police are perceived as biased. National and religious symbols are not used to create unity but to feed divisions and insecurity among minorities. And the overburdened and cumbersome judiciary systems are not able to enforce a strong rule of law.
The failure, moreover, to bring to justice thousands of people suspected of war crimes, in particular Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, who helped orchestrate ethnically motivated mass expulsions, continues to cast a pall over the progress made and has done nothing to reduce fears and insecurity.
There are still almost 500,000 internally displaced persons as a result of the Balkan wars. Thousands live miserably in ramshackle collective centers or "informal settlements" that were never intended to become permanent housing. Many of them have no place to go and are incapable of living on their own.
The international community has wound down its financial and political support for the region. There are no funds left to rehabilitate living conditions and find solutions for the most vulnerable among the refugees and internally displaced. There are no means to give 5,000 survivors the psycho-social care that would make their lives less of a living hell.
Several steps are needed urgently in the Balkans. First, there must be an immediate, concerted effort to find solutions for the most vulnerable people still in collective shelters - particularly the Roma in Northern Mitrovica.
Second, help must be extended to those who prefer to integrate locally, so that they have access to jobs and public services.
Third, efforts must be made to better inform displaced persons and minorities about their rights, to simplify administrative rules so they can claim their entitlements, and to halt discriminatory practices against them.
Fourth, donor governments and the World Bank should be encouraged to invest in rebuilding schools, health facilities, housing and other infrastructure, so that displaced persons and returnees begin to lead normal lives.
Finally, all crimes and acts of violence against the displaced and those returning must be investigated and prosecuted. Only then will the promise of Dayton be fully realized.
Walter Kälin is the representative of the UN secretary general on the human rights of internally displaced persons.
BALKANS: SERBS INCREASINGLY SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO
BELGRADE, Dec. 20, 2005 (IPS/GIN) -- While nationalist politicians are pushing to keep Kosovo a part of Serbia, polls show most Serbs are ambivalent.
The fate of Kosovo, home to 1.8 million ethnic Albanians and run for more than six years by the United Nations, tops the news highlights of the state-controlled media, as the opening of talks on the definitive status of the southern Serbian province nears in January.
Often opening the daily news broadcasts are statements by Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica or other members of his cabinet, who vow "never to give up Kosovo," and they hold a number of complicated legal arguments in their hands.
All indications are that ethnic Albanians, or Kosovars, want nothing less than independence, and Serbian politicians are not ready to accept that.
Instead, Kostunica offers a formula of "more than autonomy, less than independence," hardly understandable to the broader public.
The U.N. administration took over Kosovo in 1999, after 11 weeks of NATO bombing of Serbia, due to the repressive politics of former leader Slobodan Milosevic against the ethnic Albanian minority.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 only formally left Kosovo within Serbia. The region's fate is to be decided in talks due to open and end in 2006.
For their part, the spectrum of more nationalist-leaning newspapers has taken to defaming ethnic Albanians, pulling out old prejudices and sometimes openly fanning ethnic hatred. Controversial ethnic Albanian politicians are often openly dubbed "criminals."
Emotional words about the Serbian Orthodox monasteries scattered throughout Kosovo remind Serbs that the province was "the cradle of our medieval state and glory." There are also vitriolic attacks against Western governments accused of trying "to dismember Serbia from its origins."
One of the favorite stories used to fan Serbian pride is about "how Serb kings ate with golden forks in Kosovo," while the European royals "tore the food with bare hands." The Serb medieval state lasted until the end of 14th century, when it fell under Turkish rule.
But recent studies have shown that, despite what politicians might say and the media try to push, Serbs are not preoccupied with Kosovo.
A study by the European Movement of Serbia and the Kosovar Institute for Political Research and Development showed that some 63 percent of Serbs from Serbia proper never visited Kosovo in their lives and felt little concern about the matter.
In-depth studies by the Belgrade Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) and Gallup Serbia also show that the Kosovo issue is something regarded with less emotion than ever. According to CeSID, 27 percent of those polled believe that Kosovo will become an independent state.
"All the data show that Serbs are more concerned about the improvement of their own living standards," analyst Djordje Vukadinovic told IPS. "The hot emotions that surrounded Kosovo issue before the NATO bombing are on the decline."
Before the NATO bombing, Serbs did not even think about granting autonomy to Kosovo. Some 39 percent are now in favor of it, a Gallup Serbia survey showed.
Like other analysts, Vukadinovic says politicians believe Kosovo can be a trump card for their rising or falling popularity. "They think about the next elections," he said.
"But in the end, people will be little concerned with Kosovo if some benefits were offered for joining the European Union (EU) or something like that," Vukadinovic said.
Serbia has just opened "Stabilization and Association Agreement" talks with the EU, though it will be at least a decade before the country will be able to join the bloc.
"The phrases that describe 'Kosovo as a cradle of our medieval state' sound very nice, but people know that the baby in that cradle is not Serb, but ethnic Albanian now," historian Desimir Tosic said in an interview with local media.
"Serbia should insist on the minority rights for the remaining Serbs and look down the road toward European integration, which means less sovereignty in the classic sense."
Kosovo is home for a tiny Serb minority now, some 90,000 people. More than 150,000 fled in 1999, when the NATO bombing ended and the U.N. took over, fearing reprisal by ethnic Albanians for all the misdeeds committed in the previous era.
Ethnic Albanians, who are Muslims, became a majority in Kosovo over the course of centuries, since medieval times and the Turkish Empire. Kosovo was returned to Serbia by the end of World War I, when the empire fell apart.
By that time, Serbs were outnumbered by ethnic Albanians several times over. Decades of a more or less autonomous Kosovo came to an end in 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic imposed direct rule of Belgrade and Serb administrative domination, which was accompanied by police repression against the local non-Serb population.
However, the romantic notions and myths that surround Kosovo in Serb memory have yet to be dismantled.
"Looking back in history, one can say that there is no proof that the lavish lifestyle and highly sophisticated routines really existed in medieval Serbian courts in Kosovo," historian Cedomir Antic wrote in his latest book "History and Illusion." "Golden forks were in use nowhere, so they could not exist in Serbia at the time" he added.
Analyst Dusan Janjic said that despite all the heavy political talk on Kosovo "remaining part of Serbia," for most Serbs "it would be unimaginable to see an ethnic Albanian as a prime minister or minister of justice.
"That is what 'Kosovo being part of Serbia' means," he added. No opinion poll showed Serbs would agree to Kosovars in high office. Indeed, surveys indicate that many were surprised to learn that Serbia was paying back $130 million annually on Kosovo's foreign debt.
"Most people do feel that Kosovo was lost back in 1999, after the NATO bombing ended," international law professor Vojin Dimitrijevic told IPS. "What we need is a broader view, not only the vision of what belongs to whom. Being in this part of Europe, the western Balkans, we have to see the ways to join the rest of the continent. With Kosovo or without it, it will be the same."
The fate of Kosovo, home to 1.8 million ethnic Albanians and run for more than six years by the United Nations, tops the news highlights of the state-controlled media, as the opening of talks on the definitive status of the southern Serbian province nears in January.
Often opening the daily news broadcasts are statements by Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica or other members of his cabinet, who vow "never to give up Kosovo," and they hold a number of complicated legal arguments in their hands.
All indications are that ethnic Albanians, or Kosovars, want nothing less than independence, and Serbian politicians are not ready to accept that.
Instead, Kostunica offers a formula of "more than autonomy, less than independence," hardly understandable to the broader public.
The U.N. administration took over Kosovo in 1999, after 11 weeks of NATO bombing of Serbia, due to the repressive politics of former leader Slobodan Milosevic against the ethnic Albanian minority.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 only formally left Kosovo within Serbia. The region's fate is to be decided in talks due to open and end in 2006.
For their part, the spectrum of more nationalist-leaning newspapers has taken to defaming ethnic Albanians, pulling out old prejudices and sometimes openly fanning ethnic hatred. Controversial ethnic Albanian politicians are often openly dubbed "criminals."
Emotional words about the Serbian Orthodox monasteries scattered throughout Kosovo remind Serbs that the province was "the cradle of our medieval state and glory." There are also vitriolic attacks against Western governments accused of trying "to dismember Serbia from its origins."
One of the favorite stories used to fan Serbian pride is about "how Serb kings ate with golden forks in Kosovo," while the European royals "tore the food with bare hands." The Serb medieval state lasted until the end of 14th century, when it fell under Turkish rule.
But recent studies have shown that, despite what politicians might say and the media try to push, Serbs are not preoccupied with Kosovo.
A study by the European Movement of Serbia and the Kosovar Institute for Political Research and Development showed that some 63 percent of Serbs from Serbia proper never visited Kosovo in their lives and felt little concern about the matter.
In-depth studies by the Belgrade Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) and Gallup Serbia also show that the Kosovo issue is something regarded with less emotion than ever. According to CeSID, 27 percent of those polled believe that Kosovo will become an independent state.
"All the data show that Serbs are more concerned about the improvement of their own living standards," analyst Djordje Vukadinovic told IPS. "The hot emotions that surrounded Kosovo issue before the NATO bombing are on the decline."
Before the NATO bombing, Serbs did not even think about granting autonomy to Kosovo. Some 39 percent are now in favor of it, a Gallup Serbia survey showed.
Like other analysts, Vukadinovic says politicians believe Kosovo can be a trump card for their rising or falling popularity. "They think about the next elections," he said.
"But in the end, people will be little concerned with Kosovo if some benefits were offered for joining the European Union (EU) or something like that," Vukadinovic said.
Serbia has just opened "Stabilization and Association Agreement" talks with the EU, though it will be at least a decade before the country will be able to join the bloc.
"The phrases that describe 'Kosovo as a cradle of our medieval state' sound very nice, but people know that the baby in that cradle is not Serb, but ethnic Albanian now," historian Desimir Tosic said in an interview with local media.
"Serbia should insist on the minority rights for the remaining Serbs and look down the road toward European integration, which means less sovereignty in the classic sense."
Kosovo is home for a tiny Serb minority now, some 90,000 people. More than 150,000 fled in 1999, when the NATO bombing ended and the U.N. took over, fearing reprisal by ethnic Albanians for all the misdeeds committed in the previous era.
Ethnic Albanians, who are Muslims, became a majority in Kosovo over the course of centuries, since medieval times and the Turkish Empire. Kosovo was returned to Serbia by the end of World War I, when the empire fell apart.
By that time, Serbs were outnumbered by ethnic Albanians several times over. Decades of a more or less autonomous Kosovo came to an end in 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic imposed direct rule of Belgrade and Serb administrative domination, which was accompanied by police repression against the local non-Serb population.
However, the romantic notions and myths that surround Kosovo in Serb memory have yet to be dismantled.
"Looking back in history, one can say that there is no proof that the lavish lifestyle and highly sophisticated routines really existed in medieval Serbian courts in Kosovo," historian Cedomir Antic wrote in his latest book "History and Illusion." "Golden forks were in use nowhere, so they could not exist in Serbia at the time" he added.
Analyst Dusan Janjic said that despite all the heavy political talk on Kosovo "remaining part of Serbia," for most Serbs "it would be unimaginable to see an ethnic Albanian as a prime minister or minister of justice.
"That is what 'Kosovo being part of Serbia' means," he added. No opinion poll showed Serbs would agree to Kosovars in high office. Indeed, surveys indicate that many were surprised to learn that Serbia was paying back $130 million annually on Kosovo's foreign debt.
"Most people do feel that Kosovo was lost back in 1999, after the NATO bombing ended," international law professor Vojin Dimitrijevic told IPS. "What we need is a broader view, not only the vision of what belongs to whom. Being in this part of Europe, the western Balkans, we have to see the ways to join the rest of the continent. With Kosovo or without it, it will be the same."
It will be difficult to defend Serbian interests in Kosovo, says president
Text of report by Serbian privately-owned TV Pink on 21 December
[Presenter] Serbian President Boris Tadic has just finished his visit to Paris and, he has said, he is satisfied with the talks. He returned to Belgrade some half an hour ago, and here is what he said.
[Tadic] I will be completely open I encountered some reactions which indicate that it will be very difficult for Serbia to defend its legitimate interests. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Serbia should give up on that. Serbia should fight for its legitimate interests by promoting democratic values, its European perspective and asking for sovereignty over Kosovo-Metohija, because that simply forms part of international law and of our historic right.
Unfortunately, the decision will not be made on the basis of law only, but it will also be based on reality and politics, but we have to fight for our interests till the very last moment.
Source: TV Pink, Belgrade, in Serbian 1830 gmt 21 Dec 05
[Presenter] Serbian President Boris Tadic has just finished his visit to Paris and, he has said, he is satisfied with the talks. He returned to Belgrade some half an hour ago, and here is what he said.
[Tadic] I will be completely open I encountered some reactions which indicate that it will be very difficult for Serbia to defend its legitimate interests. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Serbia should give up on that. Serbia should fight for its legitimate interests by promoting democratic values, its European perspective and asking for sovereignty over Kosovo-Metohija, because that simply forms part of international law and of our historic right.
Unfortunately, the decision will not be made on the basis of law only, but it will also be based on reality and politics, but we have to fight for our interests till the very last moment.
Source: TV Pink, Belgrade, in Serbian 1830 gmt 21 Dec 05
Kosovo's President Rugova reported to be in "critical condition"
Text of report by Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA
Pristina, 22 December: Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova is in a critical condition and doctors in the US Bondsteel military base near Urosevac are fighting for his life, Muhamed Hamiti, the press spokesman in Rugova's office, has said.
In a short statement to journalists, Hamiti said that Rugova's health condition was unchanged and that he was under medical observation.
All officials in the Kosovo Assembly have been alerted and it has been learnt unofficially that measures have been put in place while news from Bondsteel is being awaited, because Rugova is in a very critical condition.
Source: SRNA news agency, Bijeljina, in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian 1008 gmt 22 Dec 05
Pristina, 22 December: Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova is in a critical condition and doctors in the US Bondsteel military base near Urosevac are fighting for his life, Muhamed Hamiti, the press spokesman in Rugova's office, has said.
In a short statement to journalists, Hamiti said that Rugova's health condition was unchanged and that he was under medical observation.
All officials in the Kosovo Assembly have been alerted and it has been learnt unofficially that measures have been put in place while news from Bondsteel is being awaited, because Rugova is in a very critical condition.
Source: SRNA news agency, Bijeljina, in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian 1008 gmt 22 Dec 05
Kosovo opposition leader Thaci promotes Rexhepi as presidential candidate
Mitrovice [Kosovska Mitrovica], 18 December: Bajram Rexhepi [former prime minister] may become Kosova [Kosovo] president if the majority of Kosovars vote for the Democratic Party of Kosova [PDK] at the next general election, provided that Hashim Thaci does not change his mind in the meantime.
PDK leader Thaci promised that the former prime minister could occupy Ibrahim Rugova's current office, addressing party members in Mitrovice, the home town of Rexhepi, who is now a PDK deputy in the Kosova Assembly.
"You elected a prime minister in the previous election, so with a PDK victory you will have a president from Mitrovice," Thaci said on Saturday [ 17 December], speaking to local PDK leaders and activists on the sixth anniversary of the party's branch.
The leader of the largest opposition party and member of the Kosova status negotiating team also promised that the issue of the divided town of Mitrovice would be resolved together with the resolution of the country's status and that "the northern part will be part of an independent Kosova".
Thaci's message to his party activists in Mitrovice and the citizens of this part of Kosova was that they should not worry too much about the various options for Kosova's status, such as, "conditional independence" and "future status," but use the "comforting argument" that "there is full unity in the negotiating team and in cooperation with international bodies we will reach Kosova's full independence".
Speaking just a few meters away from the bridge that divides the town of Mitrovice, Thaci said that he supported decentralization, but not the kind of decentralization based on ethnic grounds, because, as he put it, "this represents a threat to Kosova's internal territorial division".
Rexhepi, the man selected to become Kosova's president in the event of a PDK victory, said that he was certain that, "in cooperation with the international community, there will not be a division of either Mitrovice or Kosova." To support his claims, he cited the Contact Group principles.
During the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the PDK's Mitrovice branch, branch chairman Ahmet Tmava said that the PDK, the main opposition party in Mitrovice, had all the potential "to become a promoter of the strategy of development and unification of Mitrovice and not make Mitrovice an object of scenarios that produce fog".
Source: Koha Ditore, Pristina, in Albanian 19 Dec 05
PDK leader Thaci promised that the former prime minister could occupy Ibrahim Rugova's current office, addressing party members in Mitrovice, the home town of Rexhepi, who is now a PDK deputy in the Kosova Assembly.
"You elected a prime minister in the previous election, so with a PDK victory you will have a president from Mitrovice," Thaci said on Saturday [ 17 December], speaking to local PDK leaders and activists on the sixth anniversary of the party's branch.
The leader of the largest opposition party and member of the Kosova status negotiating team also promised that the issue of the divided town of Mitrovice would be resolved together with the resolution of the country's status and that "the northern part will be part of an independent Kosova".
Thaci's message to his party activists in Mitrovice and the citizens of this part of Kosova was that they should not worry too much about the various options for Kosova's status, such as, "conditional independence" and "future status," but use the "comforting argument" that "there is full unity in the negotiating team and in cooperation with international bodies we will reach Kosova's full independence".
Speaking just a few meters away from the bridge that divides the town of Mitrovice, Thaci said that he supported decentralization, but not the kind of decentralization based on ethnic grounds, because, as he put it, "this represents a threat to Kosova's internal territorial division".
Rexhepi, the man selected to become Kosova's president in the event of a PDK victory, said that he was certain that, "in cooperation with the international community, there will not be a division of either Mitrovice or Kosova." To support his claims, he cited the Contact Group principles.
During the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the PDK's Mitrovice branch, branch chairman Ahmet Tmava said that the PDK, the main opposition party in Mitrovice, had all the potential "to become a promoter of the strategy of development and unification of Mitrovice and not make Mitrovice an object of scenarios that produce fog".
Source: Koha Ditore, Pristina, in Albanian 19 Dec 05
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)